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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

INTERNAL COLONIALISM IN THE USSR: THE CASE OF SOVIET UKRAINE

by

ANNA BISCOE

(C)

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS WITH A NOTATION OF SPECIALIZATION IN EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1986

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ISBN 0-315-32442-2

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TO CHRISTROPHER AND MICHAEL

ABSTRACT

Theories of modernization and integration are common in both Western and Soviet ideologies. They claim that through the processes of industrialization, urbanization and mass education, in time, political and cultural integration will result between two or more distinctly different ethnic groups living in adjacent regions. There is sufficient evidence to show that this has not been realized in both Western democracy and the Soviet Union. During the last two decades, the ressurgence of self-assertiveness amongst the nationalities of the USSR, especially the Ukrainians, has posed a serious problem for the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This thesis represents an attempt to examine the reasons why in the course of their political and economic development, Ukraine and Russia have not succesfully integrated into a single culturally homogenous political unit but instead have produced a reactive form of ethnicity and a persistence of cultural identity amongst Ukrainians. The theoretical framework for this study will be the internal colonial model as posited by Hechter. The model states that in some cases the malintegration between core (in this case study Russia) and periphery (Ukraine) can be attributed to the nature of the economic development and the historic relationship between the regions. What can eventually emerge is a form of colonial dependence where the periphery becomes economically, politically, culturally and socially subordinated to the core leading, in time, to a cultural division of labour.

The case study of Ukraine's position within the USSR is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to apply Hechter's internal colonial model to a socialist society. Chapter One defines some key terms, examines Western and Soviet theories of modernization, explains the internal colonial model in some detail, and reviews a selection of literature on the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Chapter Two discusses the establishment of initial advantage of Russia over Ukraine and their socio-economic relationship. Chapters Three and Four, respectively, explore the cultural and political aspects of an internal colony.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis could not have been completed without the support and encouragement of several people. I particularly wish to express sincere gratitude to my supervisor Bohdan Krawchenko, Director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Without his suggestion, encouragement and help, the writing of this thesis would not have been embarked upon. I also wish to thank Dr. Max Mote for his insightful critique and penchant for perfection, and Dr. Tova Yedlin for her assistance. My largest debt of gratitude goes to David and my parents. Their constant understanding, patience and support throughout the duration of my studies and the writing of this thesis made everything possible.

I also wish to acknowledge and express sincere thanks to the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for awarding me a Master's Fellowship towards the writing of this thesis.

Any errors of fact, interpretation or otherwise are soley my responsibility.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Traditional Western modernization theory and official Soviet ideology have much in common. Both claim that industrialization, urbanization, the development of mass communication and protracted social interaction will bring about, in time, the political and cultural integration and the assimilation of distinct ethnic groups inhabiting the same region. Yet, evidence suggests that such a process has not occurred in the Soviet Union. Indeed, during the last two decades ethnic diversity has emerged as a source of tensions. The rise in the national self-assertiveness of many of the nationalities in the USSR, especially the Ukrainians, has posed a serious problem for the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Dissatisfaction with existing nationalities policies was expressed by many members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1960s. For instance, writers demanded that Ukrainian be entrenched as the language of administration, education and culture.[1] The need for greater political and economic autonomy, and the Ukrainianization of public life was also raised by the intelligentsia, and these demands were supported by top levels of the Ukrainian government.[2] Similar expressions of national sentiment were manifested by the Crimean Tartars, the Baltic peoples and the nations of the Transcaucaus.[3]

This thesis will discuss and attempt to explain the ethnic solidarity and cultural distinctiveness that exists amongst Ukrainians in the USSR, despite the prognosis of Western modernization theorists and of Soviet ideology. In doing so, the theoretical model of internal colonialism as advanced by Michael Hechter will be used.[4]

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[1]Among the earliest supporters of Ukrainian language rights were Lina Kostenko, Ivan Drach, Pavlo Tychyna and Ivan Dziuba. For a detailed analysis of the political unrest during the 1960s see: Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1971); Kenneth Calvin Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policies* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980); Borys Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine: 1953 - 1980* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1984):41-91.

[2]The best known advocate of national demands was Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) from 1963 to 1972.

[3]The development of nationalism amongst the non-Russian nations of the USSR is a well-documented phenomenon. See: Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* 32 (November-December 1983):1-15; Zev Katz, et al. eds., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (Boston: MIT, 1975), see especially sub-chapters entitled "Recent Manifestations of Nationalism."

[4]Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National*

First, however, a comment on the use of models. Using a systematic approach based on specific units of analysis, model denrich our understanding of socio-economic and political relationships. By logically structuring empirical data, greater understanding can be achieved in previously unexplored areas, and a variety of perceptions and interpretations can be elucidated given specific cases and sets of criteria. The conclusions derived, and predictions made can then contribute to the formulation of broader theories. But models also have their disadvantages. Not all societies are identical and too often in trying to achieve universal validity, scholars using models make hasty generalizations not warranted by the cases under study. Moreover, situations change whereas models tend to be static. Nontheless, because they highlight critical factors, models are essential analytical tools in the social sciences.[5]

The internal colonialism model was developed by Hechter in an effort to explain the persistence of cultural identity in a modernized state as well as to understand the sources of reactive ethnicity. The latter refers to a movement actively emphasizing ethnic identity, one which has the potential of culminating in secessionist aspirations. Although Hechter used the historical relationship between England and the Celtic fringe as his case study, his analysis has more general applicability. In essence, the internal colonial model explores the reasons why, in the course of their political and economic development, certain adjacent regions having culturally divergent groups do not successfully integrate into a single, culturally homogenous political unit, while others do. The model states that in some cases the malintegration can be attributed to the nature of the economic development and relationship between the regions. What can eventually emerge is a form of colonial dependence where one region (the periphery) becomes subordinated economically, politically, culturally and socially to another region (the core). The persistence of subordination and the presence of inequalites, such as a lesser degree of economic development, lower standard of living and lower levels of education, results in a cultural division of labour. This division of labour is defined as a hierarchical system of stratification which is based on observable cultural traits such as language and religion. Of course, Hechter is not the first to have applied the notion of internal colonialism.[6] He is,

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[4](cont'd) *Development 1536-1966* (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1976).
[5]Richard Simeon, *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 11.
[6]Hechter states that the concept of internal colonialism was first used by Lenin

however, the first to expand the concept into a full-length dissertation in an attempt to validate internal colonialism as a theory of national development and to compare it with the diffusion and functionalist models of ethnicity which have hitherto dominated the Western literature on modernization, national integration and nation-building.

The diffusion models, according to Hechter, predict that with industrialization and increased interaction, core values spread to the periphery and ethnic and cultural differences lose their salience. As a consequence of these integrative processes, nation-building takes place. The internal colonial model, on the other hand, predicts a different outcome. Because national development occurs through political domination by core groups, cultural differences in the periphery persist or even increase.[7]

In testing the internal colonial model, Hechter has examined Great Britain. Since his substantive effort others have applied the model to a variety of regions found in France, Finland, USA, Canada, Hungary, Italy,[8] and Scotland.[9] As might be expected, in each case the findings differ. Some authors consider the model to be useful in developing a better understanding of ethnic relations, while others feel that certain aspects of the model have to be changed. At least one writer concluded that the model is inadequate in solving the problems of his particular case study.[10] In any case, all studies using Hechter's internal colonial model have dealt with ethnic and regional interrelationships in industrialized Western democracies. A detailed analysis of ethnic relations informed by the internal

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[6](cont'd) in his discussion of the development of Russian capitalism, *Internal Colonialism*, pp. 8-9. Others that have used the model prior to Hechter's work are Pablo Gonzales-Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 1 (Number 4, 1965):27-37; and Rodolpho Stavenhagen, "Classes, Colonialism, and Acculturation," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 1 (Number 6, 1965):53-77; Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton have also used the model to analyse the black ghettos of America, *Black Power* (New York: Random House, 1967).

[7]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, pp. 6 and 9.

[8]A special issue of *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2 (July 1979), is devoted to the discussion of internal colonialism based on Hechter's model. The articles included are: Jack Reece, "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Brittany," pp. 275-91; Risto Alapuro, "Internal Colonialism and the Regional Party System in Eastern Finland," pp. 341-59; Kathleen V. Ritter, "Internal Colonialism and Industrial Development in Alaska," pp. 319-40; Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec," pp. 293-317; Katherin Verdery, "Internal Colonialism in Austria-Hungary," pp. 378-99; and Alberto Palloni, "Internal Colonialism or Clientelistic Politics? The Case of Southern Italy," pp. 360-77.

[9]Norman Furniss, "Internal Colonialism: Its Utility for Understanding the Development of Higher Education in Scotland," *Development and Change* 7 (1976):445-67.

[10]The writer in question was Alberto Palloni who examined Southern Italy. See his "Internal Colonialism or Clientelistic Politics," ibid.

colonial model has yet to be carried out with industrialized socialist societies having totalitarian forms of government in mind. This may be in part due to Hechter's own speculations:

> The state can play a central role in promoting national development by transferring resources from the core to the periphery, as well as by legislating against the perpetuation of the cultural division of labour....For this reason, it may be expected that socialist states are placed at an advantage, relative to capitalist states, in coping with the problems of internal colonialism.[11]

This case study of Ukraine's position within the USSR is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to apply Hechter's internal colonial model to a socialist society. In our introduction we will first define key terms; secondly, examine Western and Soviet theories of modernization, national integration and nation-building; thirdly, the internal colonial model will be explained in greater detail; and finally, we will review briefly the literature dealing with the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Chapter Two of this work discusses the establishment of initial advantage by Russia over Ukraine and the socio-economic determinants of an internal colony. The latter entails an analysis of Ukraine's economy and society, its agricultural and industrial development, as well as trends in urbanization, social mobility and social stratification. Chapter Three explores the cultural aspects of the problem. Here, language and religion are considered as two of the most important objective cultural markers used to assign specific roles in the social structure. Chapter Four deals with the political aspects of an internal colony. Here Ukraine's present status within the USSR as well as the dissident movement is discussed. Chapter Five, the final chapter, will attempt to critically assess the internal colonial model as developed by Hechter and test its applicability to the Soviet Ukrainian case. Because the model is broad and comparative, dealing with historical, political, social, economic, and cultural factors, some themes may overlap. For example, language, in terms of its importance to education, social mobility and cultural affinity, will be dealt with in more than one chapter. Let us now turn to some definitions.

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[11]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 350.

A. Definitions

In any discussions of modernization, national development and integration, certain key terms such as nation, nationalism, nationality, culture, ethnic, and ethnicity are used repeatedly. Because meanings and interpretations of concepts can often be ambiguous, it is important to have clear working definitions of these terms.

Nation, then, refers to a people who have a distinctive language, culture and a conscious sense of identity based on the belief (real or perceived) of common descent. Thus, it refers to distinct peoples such as Ukrainians, Armenians, and Czechs, but not to a collection of peoples who are of a multi-ethnic background such as the Soviet people or the Czechoslovak people.[12] A *nation* is a "socially constructed boundary which serves to designate societal membership to some groups and not to others" and *nationality* is "the concept which best expresses that sense of relatedness which holds between individuals in society."[13] A nation does not necesarily possess its own *state*, the latter being a specific territory whose population is organized politically, administratively and posseses sovereignty or the right to control its own fate. *Nationalism* is the loyalty expressed by a people towards their nation and should not be confused with patriotism, which is loyalty to the state.[14]

The terms *ethnic* and its derivative *ethnicity* are somewhat more difficult to define. Initially, *ethnic* referred to the "physical and mental traits in races."[15] Recently, the term *ethnic* has had a cultural dimension incorporated into its meaning. Hechter uses the term with this expanded definition in mind. *Culture* and *ethnicity*, however, are not interchangeable terms. *Culture* is defined here as a set of observable customs, lifestyles and behaviors encompassing objective attributes such as language, religion, dress or diet; traits which identify a group, but are independent of that group's relationship to the means of production.[16] *Ethnicity*, on the other hand, refers to the emotions and sentiments which coalesce individuals into a solidarity group on some cultural basis. *Ethnicity* alludes to the quality of "relations existing between individuals sharing certain cultural

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[12]Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. xiv.
[13]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 4.
[14]Ibid.
[15]Louis L. Snyder. "Nationalism and the Flawed Concept of Ethnicity," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 2 (Fall 1983):257.
[16]Ibid., pp. 311-12.

behaviors,"[17] and is thus more intangible than visible cultural characteristics.

An *ethnic group*, then, is distinct from other types of human collectivities in that its existence is based on objective cultural traits and possesses a subjective self-conscious identity that seeks status and recognition either as an equal or superior in relation to groups of a similar type.[18] A *nationality* can be considered an extension of the ethnic group, one which has demanded recognition and has gained a national consciousness along with the desire to govern itself. [19]

It should be noted that in the Soviet Union *nation* and *nationality* have slightly different meanings. *Nation*, according to Stalin's definition, which is still in vogue, is "an historically evolved, stable community of culture."[20] According to Walker Connor, *nationality* in Marxist-Leninist literature tends to have two meanings, that stage of development prior to a people gaining nationhood; or that portion of a nation living beyond the state where the majority of the members of the nation reside. Republic status in the Soviet Union is given to *nations*. Thus, the question of statehood is decisive in the Soviet definition of both *nation* and *nationality*.[21]

B. Theoretical Perspectives

The political science literature on the development of nations focuses on the processes of modernization, political and national integration, national development and nation-building. Let us examine each of these terms more closely. *Modernization* describes the gradual social, economic and technological change that has occurred in both Western nations and third world countries.[22] Theories of modernization deal with the process by which traditional societies, characterized by an agricultural economy and a relatively simple social structure, evolve into modern societies, with advanced technology and a complex, differentiated social structure. *Political integration* involves the

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[17]Ibid., p. 312.
[18]Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," *Ethnicity* 3 (July 1976):226.
[19]Ibid., p. 227.
[20]Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (London: International Publishers, 1942), p. 12.
[21]Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p. xv.
[22]Norman Vig and Rodney Stiefbold, eds., "Modernization and Political Development in Western Nations: An Overview," in *Politics in Advanced Nations: Modernization, Development, and Contemporary Change* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 5.

emergence of consensus between different social classes and ethnic groups and accompanies modernization. In this process ethnic and religious cleavages lose their significance and political parties and interest groups are no longer confined to narrow segments of the population. It is thought that once political integration is complete, radical social movements and class conflicts are dissipated and replaced by peaceful economic competition for material benefits.[23] *National integration* is achieved when small ethnic or linguistic groups evolve into a single nationality while *national unification* points to their territorial integration. *National development* is a process that occurs within a given territory when it is transformed from a state of sectional or competing economies, polities and cultures into a "society composed of a single, all-pervasive national economy, polity and culture."[24] For Hechter the process of national development in industrial societies encompasses three separate processes namely, cultural, economic and political integration. He refers to cultural integration as a state where objective cultural differences between groups are no longer evident and common national symbols and values have evolved; economic integration as the achievement of social and economic equality among groups; and political integration a situation where groups jointly determine their political behaviour.[25] *Nation-building*, as argued by Karl Deutsch, is the process that converts "tribes into nations." This largely refers to the transition of African tribes into nation-states where, through increased literacy, urbanization and exposure to mass communication, political attachments to small ethnic, cultural or linguistic groups are weakened and replaced by a common language and culture.[26]

Contemporary theorists of modernization such as C. E. Black maintain that as societies are modernized, they are affected by a universal set of imperatives, or "world culture." [27] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, in *The Civic Culture*, state that through the active role of a central government there is a convergence of economic and bureaucratic services leading to a similarity of political life, which establishes a national "political culture."[28] However, Western modernization theory, as an approach to national

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[23]Ibid., pp. 33-34.
[24]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 17.
[25]Ibid., pp. 18-19.
[26]Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., "Introduction," in *Nation-Building* (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 7-8.
[27]C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 8.
[28]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton

development, is rooted in nineteenth century theories of the development of social structures. Structural-functionalists, such as Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons and Max Weber, considered social evolution to be based on the functional interdependence of economic, social and political development. Durkheim stated that increased interaction and interdependence between cultural groups of society leads to a division of labour. With growth in the specialization of roles, social communities advanced, and new forms of social solidarity developed, resulting in the integration of society.[29] Talcott Parsons contended that exposure to the cultural modernity of the core caused the peripheral group to undergo a transformation of its values and normative orientations.[30] According to Max Weber, the process of ethnic change occurred as a result of a shift of "affinity on the basis of status group to affinity on the basis of class."[31] Status groups were those collectives which had a distinct culture and social structure and were hierarchically ordered. These groups were in constant competition with each other for power and authority. Class, on the other hand, which remained constant, was characterized by a high degree of modernity and was organized functionally according to occupational groups.[32] The reason for shift was due to structural changes such as the expansion of the economic marketplace. This development destroyed traditional economic organizations in favour of the state which, in the end and due to its power, had greater status than the individual group. Hecther has termed the theories of these scholars, diffusion theories or models.[33]

Fred W. Riggs has outlined some of the problematic aspects that have arisen with the concepts of political development and modernization.[34] He suggests that the problems are, to a degree, due to the variety and diversity of definitions that have been put forward by many authors, and it is this diversity that tends to generate ambiguity in the understanding of the concepts. He does admit, however, that the substantial literature which has been produced on political development has made a significant contribution to

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[28](cont'd) University Press, 1963).
[29]Vig and Stiefbold, "Modernization and Development in Western Nations: An Overview," p. 6.
[30]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 23.
[31]Ibid., p. 313.
[32]Ibid., p. 37.
[33]Ibid., p. 6.
[34]Fred W. Riggs, "The Rise and Fall of 'Political Development,'" vol. 4: *The Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. Samuel L. Long (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 289-348.

our knowledge about politics.[35]

In general, though, it still remains that according to Western modernization theory, national development and integration are an inevitable outcome of increased interaction between two or more culturally distinct groups. Regions which were first to establish effective bureaucratic administrations and strong governments became the core, for example Castile in Spain, Ile de France in France, Wessex and then London and the Home Counties in England. In each case, as the core advanced technologically and extended its political influence and control, it engulfed outlying, or peripheral, regions with distinctly different cultural traits such as language, religion, kinship structures, and life styles. Once these differences between the adjacent groups ceased to have social significance, and the core and periphery assimilated into one national culture, a process of national development can be said to have taken place.[36]

As Hechter points out, however, protracted interaction between England and the Celtic fringe did not bring about unified national development. In fact, contrary to the predictions of many structural-functional theorists, many of the world's complex industrialized societies are today faced with significant nationalist movements based on ethnic and cultural solidarity. Some years ago Walker Connor made an important point that still holds today. In his article "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?"[37] he forcefully stated that the ethnic element within the nation-state is a fundamental reality, a fact which is too often neglected or overlooked:

> Of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 percent) can be described as essentially homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint. An additional 25 states (18.9 percent of the sample) contain an ethnic group accounting for more than 90 percent of the state's total population, and in still another 25 states the largest element accounts for between 75 and 89 percent of the population. But in 31 states (23.5 percent of the total), the largest ethnic element represents only 50 to 74 percent of the population, and in 39 cases (29.5 percent of all states) the largest group fails to account for even half of the state's population. Moreover, this portrait of ethnic diversity becomes more vivid when the number of distinct ethnic groups within states is considered. In some instances, the number of groups within a state runs into the hundreds, and in 53 states (40.2 percent of the total), the population is divided into more than five significant groups. Clearly, then, the problem of ethnic diversity is far too ubiquitous to be ignored by the serious scholar of "nation-building," unless he subscribes to the position that ethnic diversity is not a matter for serious concern.[38]

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[35]Ibid., p. 337.
[36]Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[37]Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?," *World Politics* 24 (April 1972):319.
[38]Ibid., pp. 320-21. We should be keep in mind that this article was written

Recently, nationalist movements have surfaced among the Scots, Welsh, Quebecois, Bretons and the Basques demanding separation from their respective central governments in Great Britain, Canada, France and Spain, in the hope of establishing themselves as separate or autonomous nations. Connor argues that Deutsch's assumption that "ethnic identity will wither away as the processes collectively known as modernization occur," is not supported by reality.[39]

Turning to the writings of Marx and Engels, it should be noted that they show no clear differentiation between nation and state. In *The German Ideology* the state is characterized as "a substitute for community," or as an "illusory community." [40] Marx and Engels favoured the development of large economic units through the process of national unification and hence had a negative attitude towards small nationalities. They were convinced that once socialism was established and the interests of the international proletarian class were realized, nationality problems would cease to exist. Nationality was considered to be subordinate to economic relations, and since national antagonisms were rooted in socio-economic factors, they manifested themselves as class struggles. According to the *Communist Manifesto* the "worker had no country" and the proletariat could only win political rights through struggle and thus constitute the nation.[41] Once this happened, nationalism *per se* would "wither away along with the state." In his treatment of political mobilization (territorial unification and development of national identity) Marx considered that group solidarity would emerge once people realized that socio-economic inequalities were part of a pattern of class oppression.

Lenin thought that an "international culture" of the world's toiling masses could be achieved through "the unity and fusion of the workers of all nations." [42] For him national culture was a weapon of the bourgeoisie designed to weaken the class consciousness of the working class. He believed that national interests in and of themselves had no intrinsinc value and that they could be considered only if they furthered the cause of

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[38](cont'd) more than ten years ago. Today there are over 160 states.
[39]Ibid., p. 321.
[40]Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 5.
[41]Jurij Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1971-1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination,* rev. ed. (Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), p. 13.
[42]V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii,* 5th ed. (Moscow, 1961), XXVI, p. 108, cited by John S. Reshetar Jr., *The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR,* 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 279.

proletarian revolution. Lenin was, however, cognizant of the multi-national composition of the Russian Empire and realized that the policy of the tsarist autocracy towards the nationalities was repressive and that it set the various peoples against each other. Thus, for tactical reasons Lenin, in *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, written in 1914, stated that oppressed nations should have the right to secede and form their own independent state. Should they choose not to secede, however, they ought to be granted a measure of local autonomy, such as the right to be educated in their own language. At this stage in the development of his ideas, Lenin rejected the notion of a federal structure for the Russian state because he felt that the proletarian revolution demanded a unitary and centralized state.[43] However, for Lenin, the right to secede did not mean that he thought secession was desirable or necessary. In evoking this right, Lenin's strategy was to try and harness the energy of the non-Russian national opposition movements to the side of his party. He was deeply committed to the idea that socialism could only be built in large states, and that nations would draw together and eventually merge, thus reaching the ultimate goal of full internationalism.[44]

After the October revolution, both Lenin and Stalin continued the centralist tradition summarized by the tsarist slogan "one and indivisible" Russia. They used the argument that larger states facilitated economic development to justify retaining all the lands accumulated by the tsars.[45] Larger states, as Marx and Engles had reasoned, were preferable because they had greater internal markets, they were more powerful and viable, and could develop an advanced system of production far better than small states. Internationalism, they argued, could best be realized through the establishment of large, advanced, industrial states, and thus the smaller national states stood in the way of reaching that goal.[46] However, they promised that the new order would equalize the economic, social and cultural disparities between the impoverished and wealthy regions of the country, dissipating national antagonisms. Lenin shared this view and felt that the

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[43]Robert Conquest, ed., *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice*, (London: The Bodley Head, 1967), pp. 16-18.
[44]V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 4th ed., 35 vols. (Moscow, 1941-50), 21:377, cited by Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine*, p. 33. Walker Connor lists a number of suggestions as to the purpose of maintaining this right in the 1924, 1936 and 1977 constitutions of the Soviet Union, in *The Nationalist Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, pp. 52-61.
[45]Reshetar, *The Soviet Polity*, p. 280.
[46]Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism*, p. 14.

vanguard, that is the Party, could bring about both regional equality and integration through policies designed to bring about urbanization, rapid industrialization, mass education and political socialization.

Under pressure from the national movements that developed during the revolution, the Bolsheviks eventually conceded a federal structure for the USSR. In 1918, the federal principal was adopted to stem the tide of separatist ambitions among the non-Russian nations.[47] The new slogan became "national in form, socialist in content." The federal structure continued to be upheld in all three constitutions of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, Leonid Brezhnev, in a speech delivered to the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971, claimed that the nationality problem had been solved and that out of the ethnic mosaic of the Russian Empire, "in the years of socialist construction a new historical community of people -- the Soviet people arose in our country."[48] Nationalist manifestations in the USSR are occasionally admitted, only to be dismissed as a very marginal phenomenon, a remnant from the past, which further development will eradicate. Nationalism, the Soviet leadership claims, is an attitude characteristic of only a tiny handful of people, most of whom are under the influence of Western bourgeois ideology.[49]

Examining nationality relations in the USSR it becomes evident that Soviet affirmation of the emergence of a "new historical community of peoples" bears little relationship to reality. As Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone has noted, "not only has the traditional sense of separate identity on the part of major ethnic groups failed to disappear, but it has begun to transform itself into modern nationalism."[50] Indeed, today one has a "resurgence and intensification of national feelings, despite virtually seventy years of extensive attempts to mobilize and equalize the population towards ultimate internationalism."[51]

There is ample evidence to suggest that national integration within two very different political systems -- Soviet communist and Western democratic -- has not been achieved. The internal colonialism model tries to grapple with the apparent failure of

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[47]Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine*, pp. 342-43.
[48]Brezhnev's speech is translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 23 (Number 14, May 4, 1971):3.
[49]See Brezhnev's speech in *Pravda*, (Moscow) December 22, 1972.
[50]Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1974):1.
[51]Ibid., p. 9.

ethnic groups to assimilate, as well as, account for the persistence of nationalism in our modern era. It is to this model that we now turn our attention.

C. The Theoretical Framework of Internal Colonialism

Hechter's internal colonial model explores how societies composed of "new, culturally divergent groups ... in the course of history, emerge to be 'nations'."[52] According to Hechter, most modern states, in the early period of their development, contained two or more separate and distinctive cultural groups. In some cases the cultural identities of the groups or regions lost their social significance, and were replaced by a single *national* culture common to all, that is, national development had been achieved.[53] However, not all societies have experienced this process since cultural and political malintegration remains very much a reality. Discussing the commonly accepted analyses of malintegration of an industrialized core with a less developed periphery, Hechter writes:

> Social structural diffusion theories claim that the malintegration of core and periphery arises from their essential differences of social organization. The 'modern' social organization of the core is characterized by a wide division of labour, high level of urbanization, capital-intensive production, small nuclear family, rationalistic bureaucratic structures, high per capita income, and those rational norms and values which naturally arise in such settings. On the contrary, the 'traditional' social organization of the periphery manifests a narrow division of labour, low level of urbanization, labour-intensive production, large extended family, personalistic and diffuse structures, lower per capita income, and traditional norms and values.... The structural diffusion theorists suggest that economic integration precedes, it does not actually cause, cultural integration and subsequent national development.[54]

Hechter argues that most of these theories, derived from third world failures of the integration process, do not account for the continued failure to integrate the culturally different groups within industrialized societies.[55]

The model of internal colonialism, on the other hand, claims that failure to integrate culturally different groups is founded in the historical, economic and cultural differences between the center and peripheral regions of a political system and not due to differences in social structure. Unlike overseas colonies, an internal colony is characterized by a contiguous border between core and periphery. Building on an initial advantage, the core

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[52]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 3.
[53]Ibid., pp. 4-5.
[54]Ibid., pp.27-28.
[55]Ibid., p. 26.

or metropolis becomes the dominant actor, which leads to an unequal distribution of power and resources. While the most important element in the relationship is the control over economic affairs, eventually the periphery is subordinated to the core in all areas of interaction such as politics, education, culture and social status. Economic subordination of the peripheral region's market to the needs of the centre is facilitated by the initial advantage gained by the core over the periphery early in their historic relationship. The subordination places the peripheral region or, internal colony, into a complementary and dependent position, and renders it incapable of competition with the core. In time, the colony lags behind in wealth, resulting in unequal economic development, and suffers a general lack of services and poorer life style.[56] Increased or persistent inequalities result in an economic and ethnic stratification based on visible cultural traits or markers which Hechter terms a cultural division of labour. The persistence of a cultural division of labour develops a certain pattern that leads to the institutionalization of policies which are discriminatory in nature against the subordinate group as specific roles in the social structure are assigned to certain individuals but not to others. A cultural division of labour has a wide-ranging effect on society. It can be seen, for example, in higher levels of frustration, made evident in the peripheral regions through a variety of social ills (alcoholism, job absenteeism, pilfering, higher rate of suicide), that can have major impact on the social and political relationships between the two groups. One of the consequences of this division of labour is a development of a distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups. The cultural division of labour becomes politically significant when the objective cultural markers attributed to a particular group are associated with economic oppression as evidenced by a lower standard of living and social and political inequalities. Thus, a cultural division of labour entails a culture of low prestige and eventually causes economic polarization, which produces distinctive regional politics or, to us Hechter's term, "peripheral sectionalism."[57] In time, the members of the periphery, with the exception of the ruling elite, join together even though there may be certain ethnic or religious differences amongst them, and share in the prevalent culture of the region. This situation does not lead to the gradual integration of the core with the periphery but, rather, tends to create an unstable political situation by generating a reactive

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[56]Ibid., p. 9.
[57]Ibid., p. 209.

nationalism, which may lead to separatist tendencies with the ultimate goal of independence.[58] Economic dependence is enhanced juridically, politically and militarily by the core. Generally, then, the core dominates the periphery politically and expolits it materially.

In an internal colony the distinctive cultural markers upon which a cultural division of labour is based center around language, religion, education and the general mores of the peripheral region's society. The central authority's own language, ideology and educational standards are imposed on the periphery, thus reinforcing the superiority of the metroplitian area. As a consequence, regional members will be made to feel that unless they discard their particular cultural traits they will be denied positions of high standing. Thus, cultural differences are also linked to economic ones since people are assigned their economic roles according to their cultural markers. Because the economy of the periphery is based on primary production, such as agriculture, a division of labour along cultural lines also has its parallel in the economic sphere. Politically, the central group formulates policies which tightly control any regional institutions including the police, local government, political offices and industry. Control over the entire system is maintained through a strong military, a closely scrutinized hierarchical system of social stratification and a common educational system. An attempt is made to homogenize the core-periphery populations through population movement. People are moved out of the peripheral areas into the central region and the metropolitan elites are moved into the colonial area. What results is the formation of islands of centrally oriented elites within the internal colonial cities.

In light of the above, if Ukraine is to be classified as an internal colony, a number of key historical, socio-economic, cultural and political indicators must be present. Firstly, one must show that inequalities have persisted in Ukraine over a long period of time. Secondly, it must be shown that Ukraine is economically dependent upon the RSFSR. This means that the development of Ukraine's economy would have to be complementary to that of Russia's. The economic output of Ukrainian industry and agriculture would have to be highly specialized and geared for export, and the pattern of industrialization and urbanization ought to be confined to relatively compact areas.[59] Also, evidence has to be

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[58]Ibid., p. 9.
[59]Ibid., p. 150.

presented showing regional discrimination in terms of income, employment, housing and education, all of which would result in ethnic stereotyping eventually leading to a cultural division of labour.[60] Thirdly, one must demonstrate the existence of a 'social' boundary defining Ukrainians in ways other than simple differentiation based on their particular cultural traits. If a cultural division exists, then Ukrainians would be found at the bottom of the stratification system while those Russians living in the Ukrainian republic would monopolize the key, prestigious positions. Furthermore, despite increased exposure to Russian culture and ethnocentrism, Ukrainians would have to maintain a strong cultural identity.[61] Finally, one must demonstrate that Russians dominate in all areas of government and Ukrainians are prevented from determining any significant aspect of public policy. Under such conditions, political demands made by Ukrainians would then be formulated in ethnic terms rather than on the basis of social class.

D. Review of the Literature

A brief review of the body of literature shows that there are basically two different schools of thought on the nature of the relationship between Ukraine and Russia in both the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods.. The first school of thought could be termed 'nationalist,' its representatives largely being Ukrainian emigre scholars who consider Ukraine to be a colony of Russia. Within this group are authors such as Konstantyn Kononenko, Ivan Koropeckyj, Zenovij Lew Melnyk and Mykhailo Volobuiev. Kononenko [62] has examined the economic relationship between Ukraine and Russia from 1654 to 1917 to demonstrate the colonial exploitation of Ukraine. Koropeckyj [63] and Melnyk[64] also deal with the subject of economic exploitation. Koropeckyj shows that Ukraine failed to receive its full share of industrial investment funds from the Soviet government, while Melnyk claims that regional disparities exist because the central Soviet government extracted 30 percent of Ukraine's revenue during the First Five-Year Plan.

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[60]Ibid., pp. 133-34.
[61]Ibid., p. 207.
[62]Konstantyn Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958).
[63]I. S. Koropeckyj, *Location Problems in Soviet Industry before World War II: The Case of the Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
[64]Zinovij Lew Melnyk, *Soviet Capital Formation: Ukraine, 1928/29-1932* (Munich: Ukrainian Free University Press, 1965).

Volobuiev, who was an early Soviet Ukrainian economist, characterized the relationship between Ukraine and Soviet Russia as that of a 'European' type of colonialism, about which more will be said later in this paper.[65]

With perhaps the exception of Volobuiev, the common feature of these studies is that they tend to argue that the economic relationships between Ukraine and the central Russian and Soviet governments resemble an 18th century overseas type of colonialism. Under those terms the colony was exploited by the metropolis for its raw materials and used as a market for the colonizer's finished products.

Another major body of literature within the 'nationalist' school of thought contains a rich selection of the more sociological studies on inter-ethnic relations within the USSR. Some of the more prolific writers in this category include Roman Szporluk, who has written several articles on the sources and causes of nationalism[66]; Bohdan Bociurkiw, who deals mostly with political dissent and church-state relations of the USSR;[67] Yaroslav Bilinsky, whose area of studies ranges from party structure to education and assimilation;[68] and Bohdan Krawchenko[69] and Wsevolod Isajiw,[70] whose works are concerned with the processes of social mobilization and urban migration.

The second school of thought consists of studies by Western sovietologists who only recently recognized the importance of nationality problems. Previously, they dealt with the USSR only in terms of its federal political structure and paid little attention to ethnic tensions or colonial relationship.[71] Among these writers are Helene Carrere

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[65]Mykhailo Volobuiev, "Do problemy ukrains'koi ekonomiky" (On the Problem of the Ukrainian Economy), in *Dokumenty ukrainskoho komunizmu* (New York, 1962), pp. 132-230.
[66]Roman Szporluk, "Russians in Ukraine and Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR," in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1975), pp. 195-218.; "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31 (January 1979):76-98.
[67]Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 3 (April 1970):74-105; and "Religion and Nationalism in the Contemporary Ukraine," in *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, ed. George W. Simmonds (Detroit: The University of Detroit Press, 1977), pp. 72-80.
[68]Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of Ukraine after 1966," in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, pp. 239-66; "The Communist Takeover of Ukraine," in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), pp.104-127.
[69]Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Impact of Industrialization on the Social Structure of Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 22 (September 1980):338-57.
[70]Wsevolod Isajiw, "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Soviet Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 22 (March 1980):58-66.
[71]See Adam B. Ulam, *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge:

d'Encausse, who in her book, *The Decline of an Empire*, [72] draws the dividing line in the nationalities problems between the Slavic and Moslem races. Although she does admit that there are tensions between the Russians and Ukrainians, these do not appear to her to be crucial because she sees Ukrainians as instruments in the Russification policies of Moscow.

Common to most of these studies is the overall lack of reference to the general theoretical writings on the question of inter-ethnic relations. Thus, contributions by authors such as Paul Brass and Michael Hechter have largely been ignored. Paul Brass, for instance, deals with elites and claims that national identity only becomes salient when the elites decide to politicize it.[73] Most 'sovietologist' and 'nationalist' scholars have tended not to relate their work to the new and interesting theoretical debate on the dynamics of ethnicity.

This thesis on Ukraine's position within the USSR represents an attempt to fill the gap between the 'nationalist' and 'sovietologist' poles and endeavors to accomplish three general tasks, of which the first is to examine the underlying causes behind Ukraine's recent display of reactive nationalism; the second is to assess the applicability of a theoretical framework that attempts to explain ethnic change and national development as developed by Michael Hechter; and finally, to contribute, however minimally, to the overall theoretical perspective of internal colonialism by exploring the model with an ethnically diverse socialist state with a highly centralized system of government.

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[71](cont'd) Harvard University Press, 1963); Gordon H. Skilling, *The Government of Communist East Europe* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966); Robert Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1963); and Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economic System* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977).
[72]Helene Carrere d'Encausse *Decline Of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt*, (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979).
[73]Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," pp. 225-41.

II. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF AN INTERNAL COLONY

Crucial to the internal colonial model is the existence of a persistent structured relationship of inequality. To demonstrate this, the early historical relationship between Ukraine and Russia will be outlined in order to determine when and how Russia established its initial advantage over Ukraine. The economic and social parameters of an internal colony will also be discussed in greater detail and will be related to conditions in Soviet Ukraine. But first, a discussion of Hechter's view on the evolution of regional economic inequality and its effects on the social aspects of life.

Hechter cites two independent bases for the development of regional economic inequality - geographic and social. Geographically, regions vary in terms of attributes such as resource base, soil composition, climate, accessibility to navigable waters and other factors potentially bearing on the production and distribution of goods.

> These factors give advantages to some regions as compared with others. 'Poles of growth' tend to occur in regions with geographical advantages relative to specific means of production. Once began, growth may continue in a region even after the loss of a one-time geographical advantage due to the benefits of other external economies, such as the availability of skilled labour, or the presence of a variety of goods and services which need not be imported, or to decisions of the central government concerning tariff and investment policies. Thus regional differences may not only persist, they may also increase with the time. [74]

In an agricultural society, good quality soil and climatic conditions are highly valued but, in an industrial society they play a lesser role. With industrialization, a shift occurs in the value of land since it is more advantageous to be near the sources of minerals and energy and have accessibily to domestic and international markets. Depending on the geographical advantages, social organization and production may undergo important changes.

The social bases of inequality, on the other hand, can include: "major differences in patterns of agricultural production, kinship systems, inheritance customs, and -- generally speaking -- modes of social organization which affect the level and type of production."[75] Hechter states that these differences can be explained by theories of migration: "One plausible account of the disparity of agricultural villages in East Anglia from those of the

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[74]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism,* pp. 130-31.
[75]Ibid., p. 131-32.

geographically similar Midlands relies on a hypothesis that Frisian migration led to a separate type of social organization in one corner of the British Isles." Once economic inequality has evolved, the redistribution of resources to bring about equalization between the dynamic region, or core, and the stagnant region, or periphery, becomes a matter of political concern. However, if the periphery is both economically disadvantaged and culturally distinct, regional parity is unlikely. The predicament of an internal colony is described by Hechter as follows:

> In these circumstances the dynamic region exercises a virtually monopolistic control over production in the peripheral area. It practices discrimination against the culturally distinct peoples who have been forced on to less accessible, inferior lands, thereby establishing a cultural division of labour. Such cultural discrimination need not be directed against individuals...a region [can be] disadvantaged in terms of income, employment, housing and education [having] decisive consequences for individuals living there.[76]

If the peripheral region is materially deprived over an extended period of time its members will be disadvantaged when competing with core members in the economic sphere. This in turn leads to ethnic stereotyping, what Hechter has called "institutional racism."[77]

In examining whether or not the relationship between Soviet Ukraine (the periphery) and the RSFSR (the core) falls within the pattern of internal colonialism, the following factors shall be considered: agriculture, industry, transportation, capital investment, government spending, urbanization, standard of living, education, and the status of Ukrainians. In addition, if Ukraine is to be classified an internal colony a number of other socio-economic features must also be evident. This would include an economy that is complementary to the RSFSR; agricultural and industrial output that is highly specialized, geared for export and consists mostly of primary products; an underdeveloped secondary manufacturing industry; a transportation system that facilitates the needs of Russian cities more readily than the needs of Ukrainian urban centers; and financial arrangements that favour Russian interests more than Ukrainian ones. In terms of urbanization and industrialization, Ukraine would persistently lag behind Russia. The location of both industry and cities would be confined to relatively compact areas resulting in a disregard for local development. Socially, Ukrainians would have a lower standard of living as well as a lower level of education than their Russian counterparts. Finally, there

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[76]Ibid., p. 133.
[77]Ibid.

would be evidence of a cultural division of labour. Here Ukrainians would be assigned their economic roles according to their cultural traits.

A. The Establishment of Initial Advantage: Ukraine Before 1917

Ukraine's economic subordination to the central government in Moscow can be traced to the 17th century with the signing of the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654. [78] At that time, Ukrainian agriculture and industry was far more developed than that of Russia's. [79] On the basis of this treaty, Russia systematically gained advantage over Ukraine. As the government in Moscow gradually changed Ukraine's system of land ownership, its inheritance practices, and taxation policy, the social, economic and political structure of Ukraine became seriously affected.

The new system of land tenure that was introduced was contractual in nature and allowed Moscow to directly intervene in the ownership of Ukrainian lands. Thus, for the first time, and at the discretion of of an extraterritorial person, namely the tsar or his appointees, Ukrainian land could be given to Russian nobility, officers and civil servants as compensation for their services to the Russian government. Ukrainian lands could no longer be passed from a father to his heirs without the final approval of the tsar's government, as could be done in Russia where father to son inheritance (votchina) remained the practise.[80]

Included in the wide sweeping changes in land ownership was the secularization of church estates. All monasteries, as well as the Kievan Academy, were forced to turn over both land and peasants to Moscow's authorities. This was a serious setback to popular

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[78]At this time Ukrainian territory under Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky consisted of lands on the left bank of the Dnieper river. "In 1667 Ukraine was partitioned between Poland and the tsardom of Muscovy. A truncated Ukraine (on the left banks of the Dnieper river) survived as an autonomous structure under Russia until 1764, when the elective office of hetman was abolished. The second and third partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795 brought the rest of Ukraine under Russian rule, with the exception of Galicia, which had come under Austrian control in 1772 [the first partition of Poland] and remained under Vienna until 1918. After 1918 Galicia fell to Polish Rule. Russian expansion to the south, which led to the conquest of the northern Black Sea coast and the Crimea from the Tatars, opened these areas to Ukrainian settlers in the late eighteenth century." Roman Szporluk, "The Ukraine and Ukrainians," in *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities,* p. 23.
[79]Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*,p. 108.
[80]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

education because the monasteries had provided the best schools and had printed the majority of books, since they were virtually the sole possessors of printing presses. Furthermore, this indirectly ruined Ukraine's paper industry, whose output was used by the monastic printing presses.[11]

A political blow was dealt Ukraine in 1764 when the Russian government abolished the autonomous hetman government and Ukraine became a *gubernia* or province of Russia. During the reign of Catherine II serfdom, which had not existed in Ukraine for some 150 years, was reinstated, and only those cossacks who remained professional soldiers were allowed to stay free.[12] In Russia, by contrast, the feudal relationship between lord and serf had remained unbroken since 1597.[13] As more land and peasants came into the hands of Russians, it became the Ukrainian peasant's duty to provide labour in return for the use of the small parcel of land that he obtained for his own livelihood. Although an edict (ukaz) of 1797 advised that a serf should work only three days a week for his master and the remainder for himself, it was often the case that he worked the whole week for the master, as the master was the one to set the days of service. [14] The following year a regulation applying only to Ukraine stated that no land could be sold without the serfs that lived and worked on it. For the serf, life was a miserable existence, he was exploited, subjected to corvee labour and barely eked out a subsistence living. The system was severe and repressive.

This is not to say that the day to day existence of the Russian peasant was any better than that of the Ukrainian one, but for Ukrainians, Russian conquest and the reintroduction of serfdom was a regressive step and it had negative social and economic effects. The number of free peasants drastically decreased as more and more were forced into servitude and absorbed by serfdom. With the liquidation of the Zaporizska Sich in 1775, the Cossacks were deprived of their last vestiges of autonomy. Some even lost their cossack status including the right to own land, which reduced them to peasants and serfs of the Russian landlords.

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[11]Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, edited, updated and with an introduction by Oleh W. Gerus, (Winnipeg: Humeniuk Publication Foundation, 1975), p. 442.
[12]Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*, p. 12.
[13]Raymond Hutchings, *Soviet Economic Development*, 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1982), p. 13.
[14]See Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*, pp. 15-17, for detailed account of a serf's obligations to his master.

Tying the peasant to the land blocked him from moving into towns, effectively curtailing any social mobility. The towns themselves soon became inhabited by foreigners as thousands of Russian, and other European colonizers migrated to Ukraine and established themselves as the dominant group in the urban labour force. [15] Also, by placing heavy labour obligations on the peasants they were allowed little time for any activity other than work for the master. This effectively prevented the formation of cottage industries and this, in turn, impeded the emergence of a skilled or semi-skilled labour force in the rural areas.[16] The end result was a very distorted social structure with a very homogeneous large peasant class, a disproportionately small Ukrainian urban population, and an insignificant stratum of nobility who, in time, became Russified in an effort to attain a degree of social status.

In Russia, however, conditions were somewhat different. There, under serfdom, the Russian peasant was given more land and was allowed to earn money, provided he forfeited a certain percentage of his earnings to his lord. This gave the Russian peasant more freedom and he could either roam the countryside as a trader or migrant worker or move to urban centres. Serfdom had not developed in Ukraine out of indigenous social and economic needs, as it had in Russia; it was imposed.[17]

Ukraine's industry under tsarist rule remained at a low level of development. This was largely due to three basic factors. Firstly, notwithstanding the influx of foreign workers to the cities, because the peasant was bound to the soil, there was a serious lack of available labour necessary to start and maintain industrial pursuits. Even though some serf labour was used in the metallurgical industry of Luhansk in Ukraine, it was unproductive and could not be introduced on a broader scale.[18] Secondly, the economy of serfdom limited the amount of capital available for the development of industrial enterprises. The bulk of the population belonged to the peasant class but that class could not, under the terms of serfdom, become the major tax paying category. The life of the peasant did not include a cash budget, as his needs were largely met through payment in kind and not through the sale of produce in city or town markets. On the other hand,

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[15]Ibid., pp. 1-10.
[16]Bogdan Krawchenko, "Social Mobilisation and National Consciousness in 20th Century Ukraine" (D. Phil. dissertation, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1982), p. 28.
[17]See Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*, pp. 1-10.
[18]Ibid., p. 35.

taxation of the urban dwellers was so excessive that little surplus funds were available for investment into any local enterprises of a larger scale. For example, "in 1858, in the Kiev region, the payment of taxes and local assessments reached two-thirds of a cash expenditure of the average household."[89] Furthermore, the nobility was exempt from taxation. Their privileged position, along with their considerable political clout, blocked any attempts at increasing the level of taxation on the landowners. Thirdly, through such actions as the introduction of new tariffs, what industry existed in Ukraine was developed to suit the requirements of the Russian economy. In 1822, utilizing its political advantage, Russia imposed new tariff policies and changed the customs duties for the entire empire. These measures had a twofold effect on Ukraine: they undermined existing trade relations between Ukraine and Germany and ruined Ukraine's national economy. The new tariffs imposed on foreign goods were often so high that many products could no longer be imported. Russian goods, on the other hand, were exempt from tariffs. As a result of decreased imports, exports also declined, greatly affecting Ukraine's merchants.[90]

The abolition of serfom in 1861 should have theoretically removed at least two impediments to industrial growth, i.e. lack of labour and capital. Freed serfs migrating to urban centers could have resolved the problem of labour supply and thus created a much larger consumer market with their earned wages. This, in turn, could have stimulated the development of light industry in the country. The terms of the emanicipation agreement of 1861, however, created new obstacles. Not only was the peasant faced with excessively high redemption payments, preventing him from buying back the land that was originally his, he also lacked the skills that would enable him to enter the industrial work force. Furthermore, even if the former serf could have bought some land, the amount which was designated for purchase was usually only a tiny plot too small to provide a decent livelihood for him and his family.[91]

Ukraine's rich natural resources were of great import to Russia's own industrial development.[92] The latter half of the 19th century saw industrialization sweeping Russia under the forceful direction of Count Sergei Witte, minister of finance in the tsar's government. With the discovery of iron ore deposits in the 1880s in Kryvyi Rih, the

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[89]Ibid., p. 34.
[90]Ibid., p. 9.
[91]Ibid., p. 137.
[92]Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917-1923, p. 53.*

relationship between Ukraine and Russia took a new turn. Until this time Russia's iron ore requirements were met by production from the Urals, which was costly and of poor quality, and consequently not conducive to the development of a metallurgical industry. However, finding high quality iron ore next to the large coal deposits of the Donets Basin produced the necessary combination required for building a large-scale metallurgical industry, a task accomplished largely through the investment of French and Belgian capital secured by the Russian government. On the eve of the First World War, in 1913, Ukraine produced 57 percent of the Russian total output of iron. [93] For Russia this was a most welcome and propitious development. The growing demands of such vital industries as railroad construction and arms manufacturing (especially since Russia was embroiled in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5) could now be met by Ukraine's mines. Ukraine, however, benefited much less from this discovery because of its underdeveloped secondary industry and the system of transportation.

Ukraine's industry centered predominantly on the extraction of raw materials. The Russian Imperial government made no effort to develop the necessary factories that would process Ukraine's natural resources into manufactured goods. Raw materials including coal, iron, wool, sugar and flax were transported to the highly developed industrial regions of Moscow and Petersburg.[94] This largely explains why the transportation system was structured to favour Russian interests. Although a railway was finally constructed into the Donbas region it was solely for the purpose of transporting goods (mostly coal and iron and later including grain) back to Russia. The decision as to the direction of railway lines was made by the Imperial Russian government and it reflected the needs of Russian business interests. For the Ukrainian economy it would have been more advantageous to have railroads built from Ukrainian centres to Black Sea ports, especially Odessa, and towards its western borders for closer contact with Austria and Germany (by way of Poland) and central Europe in general. [95] Instead, the railway was constructed on a north-south axis. This rendered Ukraine economically dependent upon the center and promoted the use of Baltic ports which were of greater interest to the industrial areas of

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[93]Ibid., p. 54.
[94]Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*, pp. 108-57.
[95]Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Economics in Scholarly and Public Thought in the 19th-20th Centuries," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, 13 (1973-1977):15.

Moscow and Petersburg than were the Black Sea ports. For Ukraine, rerouting its products, especially grain, over greater distances than necessary resulted in higher transportation costs which ultimately decreased profits.

Only Russia gained from a transportation policy of this nature. The relationship described above fits into the framework of Hechter's discussion of transportation and industrialization in the context of internal colonialism.

> Since the colony's role is designed to be instrumental, development tends to be complementary to that of the metropolis. The colonial economy often specializes in the production of a narrow range of primary commodities or raw materials for export. Whereas cities arose to fulfil central place functions in societies having had endogenous development, the ecological distribution of cities looks very different in colonies, where they serve as way stations in the trade between colonial hinterlands and metropolitan ports...Similarly, transportation systems arise not to spur colonial development - they are seldom built to interconnect the various regions of the colony - but to facilitate the movement of commodities from the hinterland to the coastal cities.[96]

From the above it also becomes evident that urbanization is an indicator of socio-economic development and that the nature of the ecological distribution is an important factor of internal colonialism. In the general process of modernization, cities play a strategic role since they are the centers of industry, communication, education, culture and political administration, but in the internal colony, cities, in addition to being "way stations", tend to be spacially confined to relatively compact areas which parallel the location of industries.

In Ukraine, urbanization was largely the result of Russia's concern with the extraction of raw materials. Thus, the only urban centres that did develop were those whose economies were based on raw material extraction. The rest of Ukraine's towns stagnated. Moreover, while industrialization increased the rate of urbanization in both Ukraine and Russia, Ukrainian cities differed from Russian cities in one important respect: they were dominated by Russians and other minorities (mainly Jewish). [97] Thus cities in Ukraine became enclaves from which minority groups could ascend to control the country economically and politically.[98] The urban development of such important centres as Kiev,

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[96]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, pp. 30-31.
[97]Krawchenko, "The Impact of Industrialization on the Social Structure of Ukraine," p. 339.
[98]John A. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 15.

Kharkiv, Odessa and Luhansk provides ample evidence of this.[99]

The initial stimulus to the growth of Kiev's population was not tied to industrial or agricultural expansion but, rather, it was as a result of the tsarist government's need to establish a strong Russian presence in that strategic region.[100] To tighten its stronghold on the city, the Russian government, in 1840, stripped Kiev of its municipal autonomy and encouraged Russian students, troops and merchants to settle there in order to increase the non-Ukrainian sectors of that city.[101]

Other major urban centers of pre-revolutionary Ukraine had even a larger Russian presence and were more tightly controlled by the central government. Odessa, Ukraine's largest city before 1917, was founded in 1774 on the explicit orders of Empress Catherine II specifically to facilitate Russian interests. It was to serve as a military outpost and a commercial port. The 1897 census showed Ukrainians represented only 5.6 percent of Odessa's population. Of these, most were poor, single males, occupying the lowest strata of society. They worked in local quarries and mines, in small scale manufacturing, transport and the military as unskilled manual labour.[102] By far the most successful inhabitants of Odessa were Russians, who retained for themselves high positions in the civil service, and the foreign merchants who were mainly French, Italian, and Jewish.

Luhansk, also founded by Catherine II (in 1775), became a single factory city whose sole purpose was to produce iron needed to keep the Russian navy supplied with cannons and ammunition throughout both the Napoleonic and Crimean wars. Like Odessa, Luhansk did not have a large Ukrainian population. Consequently, most of the factory labour and plant management was drawn from the Russian population.[103]

A similar pattern of ethnic distribution and Russian hegemony could be found in other major industrial centres, most of which were simply one factory cities. Cities in Ukraine were dominated by foreigners, mainly Russian and Jewish. This gave them control

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[99]See Peter Woroby, "The Role of the City in Ukrainian History," in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. Ivan L. Rudnytsky and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1981), p. 204.
[100]See Patricia Herlihy's article on nineteenth century Ukrainian cities which gives greater details about the growth of five important Ukrainian cities during this century, in "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century," ibid., pp. 137-40.
[101]Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, p. 140.
[102]Herlihy, "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 146-48.
[103]Ibid., p. 150.

of Ukraine's social, economic, cultural and political life. Moreover, the larger the city, the higher the proportion of foreigners.[104] Writing about the city through the eyes of a Ukrainian peasant, the Ukrainian Bolshevik historian Skorovstanskii (Shakhrai) made this comment in 1919:

> The city rules the village, the city is alien. The city draws to itself all the wealth and gives the village nothing in return. The city extracts taxes which never return to the village. In the city one must pay bribes to be freed from scorn and red tape. The city is expensively dressed as for a holiday, it eats and drinks well, many people promenade. In the village there is, besides hard work, impenetrable darkness and misery, almost nothing. The city is aristocratic it is alien. It is not ours, not Ukrainian. It is Russian, Jewish, Polish, but not ours, not Ukrainian.[105]

Ukraine's process of urbanization was not organic, rather, development occurred to suit the needs of others. Almost overnight cities arose in Ukraine, but they were inhabited by foreigners. Because of foreign investment in raw material extraction, the Donbas basin became heavily industrialized, a process that did not take place in the rest of Ukraine, which remained agricultural, underdeveloped and overpopulated.

An examination of the impact of Russian policies on Ukraine's internal markets, trade, the location of manufacturing centers and the levying of taxes sheds light on yet another aspect of Ukraine's colonial status, namely, that Ukraine's internal markets were developed to suit the interests of the metropolis. An example of this is the textile industry. Ukraine was one of the world's major producers of flax, yet its population's textile needs could not be met because there were no manufacturing centers in the country. The large linen factory that had existed in Potchep had been dismantled by tsarist officials and reassembled in Russia early in the 18th century.[106] As a result Ukrainian flax was sent to factories in Poland and Russia to be made into shirts which were then returned to Ukraine for sale. This not only unnecessarily added to the cost of the final product, but it also prevented Ukraine from establishing its own textile industry which could provide much needed employment for its own population.[107]

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[104]See Krawchenko, "Social Mobilisation and National Consciousness in 20th Century Ukraine," p. 25.
[105]P. Skorovstanskii, *Revoliutsiia na Ukraine*, (Saratov), pp. 7-8, cited by H. R. Weinstein, "Land, Hunger and Nationalism in the Ukraine, 1905-1917," *Journal of Economic History* 2 (May 1942):31.
[106]Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*, p. 25.
[107]James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983), p. 171.

Unfair taxation practices also hampered Ukrainian economic development. After the 1861 emancipation, peasants were very heavily taxed and this led to the impoverishment of a large portion of the population. Moreover, all taxes collected were deposited into the treasury of the central government in Moscow. Kononenko claims that only a small portion of the taxes raised in Ukraine were returned to Ukraine. This meant that the insfrastructure of Ukraine's economy -- roads, telegraphs, schools and the like -- was also not developed.[108] In addition, due to excessively high customs duties imposed in 1822, Ukraine's international trade was ruined. Imports from other other European centers were soon crowded out, leaving the Ukrainian market completely open for Russian goods, which were exempt from tariffs and duties.

Tsarist economic policies resulted in the decline of important sectors of Ukrainian industry such as glass, porcelain and metallurgy.[109] In general, Russian economic policies in Ukraine were designed to transform Ukraine into a supplier of raw materials for Russia's industry, to ensure that Ukraine remained a market for Russian manufactured goods, and finally, to protect Russian industry and commerce from Ukrainian competition.[110]

In summary, it is evident that the social and economic structure of Ukraine had been changed drastically by over two and a half centuries of Russian rule. Prior to the signing of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, Ukraine boasted a relatively representative form of government, a free peasantry, as well as industry and agriculture which were more advanced than that of Russia. By 1917 Ukraine had been transformed into a colony. Its transportation system and industrial development was complementary to the needs of the core. Characteristic of its social structure was the fact that Russians and other non-Ukrainian minorities were in positions of power in the Russified Ukrainian cities. A cultural division of labour had clearly emerged: Ukrainians remained a predominantly rural people and at the bottom of the social ladder. Once the Bolsheviks established themselves as victors they were not about to easily relinquish possession of the borderlands, or the periphery, of the Russian Empire. They were quick to realize the economic importance of Ukraine and its tremendous potential as a future supplier of natural resources for the new Soviet state. This was the premise on which the new Communist leadership in Moscow

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[108]Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*, p. 45.
[109]Ibid., pp. 24-25.
[110]Ibid., p. 108.

formulated its policies towards Ukraine within the USSR.

B. Economic Inequality in Soviet Ukraine

Characteristic of internal colonialism is the existence of serious regional disparities between the relatively advantaged core group and the less developed periphery. Since the regional market is developed to meet the needs of the center, the peripheral area becomes dependent and complementary to the core. Industrialization in the center is characteristically diversified but in the outlying regions, industry usually has a fairly narrow base and is highly specialized, since its production is geared primarily for export. Decisions about wages, credit and investment are made at the discretion of the core. Because of its economic dependence, wealth in the periphery lags behind the core and the periphery also suffers a general lack of services and poorer life style.[111] In examining whether the socio-economic relationship between Soviet Ukraine and the RSFSR falls within the pattern of internal colonialism, the following factors will be considered: the status of Ukrainians within their own republic, government spending, education, health-care, levels of income, urbanization, industrialization, capital investment, and standard of living.

It should be recalled that in an internal colony geography and social factors are the bases upon which regional economic inequality can develop. The geographical causes of inequality include such things as the resource base, soil fertility, climatic conditions, and accessibility to navigable waters, all of which affect the production and distribution of goods. In this context, Soviet Ukraine should be in an advantageous position. It is a country endowed with valuable natural resources, its soil is without doubt the world's best for agricultural purposes, and it has ports on the Black Sea which operate all year round. Thus, Ukraine has all the prerequisites for a diversified economy with a broad industrial base and industrial centers that need not be spatially confined to relatively compact areas. Since, as will be shown, Ukraine's level of economic development is below that of the RSFSR's, it appears then that government policies and not geography account for Ukraine's economic predicament. These policies can only be understood within the context of the structure and functioning of the Soviet Union's economy as is briefly

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[111]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 9.

discussed below.

The most important aspect of the Soviet economic system is that it is highly centralized and planned. All crucial economic decisions, such as resource allocation, investment, production of goods and services, agricultural development and industrial expansion, are not determined by market forces, as they would be under a free enterprise system, but rather by administrative decisions made in Moscow. These are set out annually by the All-Union Gosplan (State Planning Committee), the central planning agency that coordinates all economic activity in the USSR. It acts as the specialist adviser to the Council of Ministers and to the Central Committee of the Party.[112] Gosplan's directives, which have to be approved by the Central Committee, are filtered down to the republic level to be implemented by local authorities. Since in the USSR the means of production are nationalized, Gosplan's instructions affect every aspect of the economy.

Centralization, planning, state ownership -- all result in a highly bureaucraticized, hierarchical system where each individual unit is controlled by a higher authority. Thus, in industry every plant is part of some other larger organization (e.g. a trust) and is subordinate to the head of the larger grouping.[113] The basic characteristics of centralization and planning have remained virtually unchanged since the 1920s and only minor reforms have been made. Hechter contends that in a centralized economy, inequality should not develop. The following discussion of Soviet economic policies and of their effects on Ukraine show the contrary to be the case.

The Economy Under Lenin and Stalin

Lenin and the Communist Party publically advocated equalization of the levels of industrial development between the non-Russian republics and the RSFSR. For this to be effectively achieved, they claimed that the economy had to be treated as a single unit. Ukraine was to become an integral part of the all-Soviet economy and was not to be treated as a separate entity. The idea of the USSR as a single economic entity was entrenched in the 1923 Constitution which outlined, in great detail, the far reaching economic powers of the All-Union government, but paid little attention to the individual national economies. The central government was granted the power to conclude internal

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[112]Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economic System*, pp. 36-37.
[113]Hutchings, *Soviet Economic Development*, p. 129.

and external loans not only for itself but also for the republics. It could also direct foreign trade and determine the system of internal trade, establish the general plans for the economic development of the whole USSR and determine which industries were to be classified as All-Union and which would remain under the jurisdiction of the republic governments. In addition, the central government could grant foreign concessions in its own name and in the name of the republics, and all budgets were to be approved by the central authorities. All aspects of taxation were in its hands, and the central authorities also laid down the general principles of land use and the exploitation of natural resources. Furthermore, the All-Union government was to have jurisdiction over labour legislation, the monetary system, statistics, and weights and measures.[114] In short, all the crucial aspects of running an economy were under the control of the central government in Moscow.

If the central government in Moscow were committed to bringing about economic equalization between regions, it could have accomplished this in a number of ways. Other than taxation, development in the periphery could have been stimulated by an increase in the level of public expenditure, by capital investments relating to military or administrative activities, and by introducing new manufacturing industry.[115] This did not occur in Ukraine, since by the mid 1920's, it was becoming increasingly evident that exploitation and not equalization was becoming the norm. It is at this time that the idea of Ukraine as a separate economic unit was asserted as a reaction against centralization and exploitation. One of the most revealing accounts of the extent of Ukraine's exploitation and loss of control over its own economic destiny during the initial stages of communist rule was Mykhailo Volobuiev's article, "Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky" (On the Problem of the Ukrainian Economy) published in the January 30 and February 16, 1928 issues of *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*[116] -- the official theoretical journal of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). Volobuiev, who was an economist and the government official that headed a large branch (holovpolitosvita) of the commissariat of education, stated that exploitation resulted from the compulsory budgetary transfers from Ukraine to Russia. He argued that these transfers were not only compulsory, they were also unilateral and without compensations.

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[114]Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation*, p. 164.
[115]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 158.
[116]Mace gives a good summary of Volobuiev's arguments in *"Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation,"* pp. 161-163.

Volobuiev addressed the problem of how to bring about economic development of the individual nations which had once comprised the Russian Empire. He began his discussion with an analysis of the pre-revolutionary period, what he called the "era of finance capitalism." The Russian Empire, argued Volobuiev, consisted of two types of colonies distinguished by their level of economic development. The more economically advanced, capital exporting former colonies of the Russian Empire such as Ukraine, Finland and Poland were called colonies of a "European" type. The more backward regions such as Turkestan and Transcaucasia whose economies focussed exclusively on the supply of raw materials were labelled "Asiatic" colonies.[117] "Imperialism", he argued, "broke down national barriers within colonies in such a way that it actually served to consolidate the national distinctiveness of the colony itself."[118] This was because as the level of economic development increased, so did the degree of national consolidation. Thus, Volobuiev felt that "National unity [was] the consequence of all economic development."[119] In Asiatic type colonies, nationalist movements by the indigenous population developed in order to gain control of their internal market; while in European type colonies the national movement was stronger and strived for independence and economic self-sufficiency.[120] Dealing specifically with Ukraine during the last decades of the Empire's existence, Volobuiev showed how Ukraine's economic development was stifled because policies affecting internal markets, industrial locations and taxation were conducted in the interests of the metropolis. Ukraine's lack of control over these crucial elements produced serious imbalances in its economy.

Volobuiev felt that the republics of the Soviet Union should be treated as equals and that their economies should be treated as individual units. He noticed that even though Ukraine was slated for an accelerated pace of economic growth, many relics of tsarist policies remained. Indeed, according to Volobuiev, the central government in Moscow carried out colonial policies in Soviet Ukraine, which were worse than those of the tsarist regime. To prove this point Volobuiev listed many exploitative measures and drew parallels between tsarist and Soviet Russian policies. For instance, the industrial locations policy remained unchanged. Major manufacturing centres were built in Soviet Russia

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[117]Mykhailo Volobuiev, "Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky," pp. 137-41.
[118]Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation*, p. 171.
[119]Ibid.
[120]Ibid.

supplied by Ukrainian raw materials. Thus, whereas Ukraine produced the bulk of sugar beets, the sugar refineries were not built in Ukraine, near the source of the raw materials, but rather in Soviet Russia. Even the newly established Institute for the Sugar Industry was not located in Ukraine, where most of the crop was grown, but in Moscow.[121] Ukrainian resources were being used to build factories in the Urals, factories which from the standpoint of profitability ought to have been located in Ukraine. On the question of budgetary transfers (the difference between taxes raised and state expenditures) there were also striking parallels between tsarist and Soviet policies. Thus, between 1893 and 1910, Volobuiev showed that while 3.3 billion rubles were raised in Ukraine, only 2.6 billion were returned, which meant that Russia gained a profit of 21 percent. In the mid-1920s an analysis of the budget showed that the central government had collected about 20 percent more in taxes than it was spending in Ukraine. In fact, between 1924 and 1927 at least 20 percent of Ukraine's investment capital was transfered to the RSFSR. Bearing in mind that Ukraine was a major battlefield during World War I and the Civil War and suffered tremendous material destruction and human losses,[122] one could have expected the republic to receive substantial subsidies. The siphoning of industrial capital out of the country seriously thwarted the rebuilding of Ukraine's economy. Volobuiev sharply criticized these exploitative policies which resembled those of tsarist colonialism.[123]

Volobuiev argued that economic policy was the key factor in resolving the nationality problem in the USSR. He concluded that Ukraine should be treated as a independent economic unit and that the need for economic independence resulted from Ukraine being a former colony of the European type, as advanced and civilized as the metropolis. Therefore, Ukraine should be allowed to enter the world economic market as an independent economic unit, without Russia acting as an intermediary.[124]

Volobuiev contended that:

> ...the legacy of colonialism in the Ukrainian language, literature, and culture could only be overcome in tandem with and economic policy that took into account the national economic organism, and that realized that the Soviet

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[121]Volobuiev, "Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky," p. 209.
[122]See Stephan G. Prociuk, "Human Losses in the Ukraine in World I and II," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 13 (1973-1977):23-50.
[123]Ibid., pp.220-26.
[124]Volobuiev, "Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky," pp.227-29.

Union was more than the sum of its regions. As things stood, national hostilities threatened to revive on an economic basis."[125]

Volobuiev's analysis, combining vast empirical detail within a theoretical framework, was presented at a particularlly critical moment in Soviet history. His work provided the much needed economic basis to the 'national communist' doctrine which advocated Soviet Ukrainian national self-assertion and independence, and to which Oleksander Shumsky and Mykola Khvylovy had already contributed the philosophic, artistic and political components.[126]

By the end of the 1920s the central government in Moscow tightened its grip over Ukraine's economy.[127] This occurred at the same time as Stalin consolidated his power. With the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan, the economic exploitation of Ukraine accelerated as the republic was forced to subsidize economic development in Russia. As Z. L. Melnyk has shown, between 1928-9 and 1932, the central government in Moscow expropriated almost a third of Ukraine's national income.[128] The republic was powerless to prevent this drain of its wealth since 84 percent of its industrial capital was in the hands of All-Union enterprises. [129]

Stalin's industrialization reinforced an economic division of labour disadvantageous to Ukraine. The republic's economy was more and more geared to the production of raw materials for Russian factories. For example, in 1932 Ukraine provided "70 percent of the Soviet Union's coal, iron and pig iron and 60 percent of its steel, [but] ....only 23 percent of the USSR's finished metal products, and by 1937 this declined to 21 percent."[130] In terms of light industry, consumer goods production amounted to 47 percent of Ukraine's gross industrial production in 1928, by 1937 this had been reduced to 38 percent.[131] In addition, there were also imbalances within the individual branches of heavy industry as shown by the fact that most of Ukraine's industrial output specialized in

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[125]Volobuiev, cited by Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation,* p.175.
[126]Vsevolold Holubnychy, "The Views of M. Volobuyev and V. Dobrohayev and Party Criticism," *Ukrainian Review* (Munich) 3 (1956):5.
[127]See Iu. Arutiunian, *Sotsialna struktura selskogo naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), p. 23, cited by Janusz Radziejowski, "Collectivization in Ukraine in Light of Soviet Historiography," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 9 (Fall 1980):7.
[128]Melnyk, *Soviet Capital Formation: Ukraine, 1928/29-1932* p. 107.
[129]*Narodno hospodarskyi plan na 1935 rik* (Kiev, 1935):102, cited by Krawchenko, "Social Mobilisation and National Consciousness," p. 309.
[130]Ibid., p. 311.
[131]Ibid., p. 310.

the machine building and metallurgy divisions, two sectors which require less processing.[132] This also meant that industry remained localized in the Donbas region where the metalurgical industrial complexes had been developed some time ago and did not expand to other areas.

Turning to agriculture, during Stalin collectivization policy Ukraine lost control of this crucial sector of its economy. For the peasant, collectivization was a new form of serfdom. The peasant could not leave his place of work without permission;[133] he lost his land and possessions, and his grain and food was requisitioned by the state, leaving little for himself and his family. That Ukraine's agriculture was exploited can be seen from the fact that in 1930 Ukraine produced 26 percent of the total Soviet grain harvest, yet accounted for 34 percent of the total state grain procurements. Payment for grain sales was not received by the collective farmers until one to two and a half years later. This large extraction of grain without appropriate recompense resulted in serious food shortages throughout Ukraine. Consequently, to keep alive, the farmers consumed the seed grain needed for future food production.[134] This action, coupled with the brutal collectivization policy, during which virtually all food reserves and many personal belongings of the Ukrainian peasant were confiscated, resulted in the devastating famine of 1932-33. It is estimated that six to seven million died from starvation in Soviet Ukraine.[135]

During World War II Ukraine's economy received new blows. Its war losses were staggering. In 1945 they amounted to 42 percent of the total USSR losses. "Over 90 percent of the industry lay in ruins, 714 cities and towns and 2,800 villages were either fully or partially destroyed, and almost 25 percent of Ukraine's population was homeless."[136] These losses do not take into account the evacuation of over 50,000 plants and factories from Ukraine to Kazakhstan in 1942, nor the fact that 60 per cent of

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[132]See I. S. Koropeckyj, *Location Problems in Soviet Industry Before World War II*, pp. 86-87.
[133]See Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation*, pp. 280-89 and p. 302.
[134]Radziejowski, "Collectivization in Ukraine in Light of Soviet Historiography," p. 12.
[135]Vsevolod Holubnychy, "The Causes of the Famine of 1932-33," *Meta* 2 (Winter 1979):24.
[136]See Z. L. Melnyk, "The Economic Price of Being a Soviet Republic: The Case of Ukraine," in *Ukraine in a Changing World*, ed. Walter Dushnyk, (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1977), p. 156.

Ukraine's collective farm cattle, 82 percent of its sheep, 27 per cent of its hogs and 14 per cent of its horses were transferred to the East in the wake of the German advance. State farms lost even a greater percentage of their livestock.[137] Most of what was taken out of Ukraine did not return to the republic after the war. Given Ukraine's enormous losses, one would have thought the republic more than entitled to its fair share of war reparations and new investment. This did not occur. Between 1946 and 1951, for example, only 15 per cent of Soviet construction funds were spent in Ukraine, where 40 per cent of the Soviet population left homeless by the war resided.[138]

The Economy After Stalin

Prior to 1953 Ukraine's position in the Soviet Union resembled that of colony rather than that of an equal partner in a federated state. Following the death of Stalin, a new era began. Khrushchev initiated the process of de-Stalinization which was to bring an end to the massive repression and unchecked arbitrariness which punctuated Stalin's regime. Khrushchev promised an improvement in the standard of living, a curb on police power, and an amnesty to political prisoners, in other words, a better life for all Soviet citizens. Agriculture was to be given concentrated attention so that production could satisfy the needs of the entire population, and there was to be a continued emphasis on heavy industry.[139] The impact of Khrushchev's leadership and policy changes on Ukraine's economic relationship with Moscow is our next topic. Here we will focus on the question of specialization in agriculture and industry, resource extraction and financial arrangements.

Agriculture

The nature of economic specialization in Ukraine is revealed throug a comparison of its output of specific industrial and agricultural products with those of the USSR. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, Ukraine was more involved in agricultural production than in industrial production in each year for which figures are given. It can, of course, be argued

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[137]Ibid., p. 157.
[138]Ibid., p. 158.
[139]See Basil Dmytryshyn, *A History of Russia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 579-89.

TABLE 2.1 Economy of Ukraine as a Percentage of the Soviet Economy (Selected Years, 1950-74)

	1950	1960	1965	1974
Population	20.5	20.0	19.6	19.3
Net material product	18.2	18.6	19.9	18.3
Industry (net output)	16.4	17.2	18.2	17.4
Electric power	16.1	18.5	18.7	18.5
Steel	30.6	40.1	40.6	38.5
Coal	29.9	33.8	33.6	31.2
Mineral fertilizers	28.0	27.8	23.4	20.3
Cement	19.7	17.8	17.0	18.7
Window glass	32.1	26.9	25.2	22.5
Tractors	20.8	36.9	33.4	25.7
Diesel locomotives	100.0	87.9	96.7	93.8
Turbines	15.0	27.6	30.1	30.0
Power transformers	6.2	50.5	46.6	45.4
Passenger autos	n.a.	0.4	20.2	8.4
Metal-cutting tools	14.9	13.1	13.4	15.0
Bulldozers	47.7	34.6	42.0	43.9
Paper	3.0	6.1	5.1	4.4
Cotton cloth	0.5	1.5	2.6	4.6
Meat	19.8	20.7	21.1	22.5
Margarine	22.2	28.3	31.5	33.7
Sugar	71.6	60.9	60.6	57.5
Agriculture (net output)	24.6	23.6	25.5	23.5
Plant crops	n.a.	23.6	26.6	25.7
Animal products	n.a.	22.8	22.4	22.2
Grains	25.1	18.0	26.1	23.5
Potatoes	22.9	23.0	21.2	25.8
Sugar beets	70.2	55.0	60.5	62.0
Vegetables	24.8	29.9	30.4	28.6
Meat	21.6	23.8	22.3	23.3
Milk	19.3	22.7	22.9	23.4
Transportation	16.1	15.6	16.7	16.3
Construction	19.1	18.6	17.9	15.9
Retail trade	15.9	17.0	17.7	17.5
Employment				
Workers and employees	17.1	17.2	17.4	17.9
Workers, employees and collective farmers	19.9	20.4	20.3	20.5
Collective farmers	24.0	29.4	31.1	31.4
Services and trade	16.0	15.9	17.1	18.1

n.a. = data not available.

Source: Stanley H. Cohn, "Economic Growth," in The Ukraine Within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 98.

that because of Ukraine's ideal soil and climatic conditions it is only natural that agriculture should be the most developed sector of the economy. Nonetheless, two important points must be mentioned in this context: firstly, there are imbalances within the agricultural sector; secondly, Ukraine is also very rich in mineral resources which could sustain a vibrant industrial and manufacturing sector. It could also be noted that central planners in Moscow themselves stress that the way to achieve equalization is through greater industrialization. Thus, in an effort to equalize the volume of production between areas, and to maximize the economic self-sufficiency of individual areas, Khrushchev, in 1957, introduced a measure of economic decentralization through the establishment of *sovnarkhozy*, or regional economic councils. The councils replaced the industrial ministries and gave the national republics a degree of autonomy to manage their own economy.[140] During the *sovnarkhoz* period Ukraine's share of industrial production improved slightly (see Table 2.1). However, the management reforms of 1965, installed following Khrushchev's ouster from power, restored bureaucratic centralism within the economic sphere. This resulted in the dwindling of the authority of the Union republics and the concentration of economic decision-making once again in the industrial ministries in Moscow.[141] The 1965 economic reforms had a negative effect on Ukraine's economy since both industrial and agricultural net output decreased. In the case of the latter the decrease was a full two percent between 1965 and 1974. After fifty years of Soviet rule, agriculture still accounted for forty percent of Ukraine's GNP in 1970.[142] Since 1950 agriculture has consistently employed close to one third of the population (see Table 2.2). These figures are high when compared to either the RSFSR or the USSR. In 1970, Ukrainians comprised only 19.5 percent of the total USSR's population, yet they accounted for almost 31 percent of the agricultural workforce in the USSR. In 1974, Ukraine's collective farmers represented about one-third of the total number of collective farmers in the USSR. Thus, Ukraine in the 1970s, as before 1917, has continued to specialize in agriculture, despite its potential of greater industrialization based on the vast

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[140]Hutchings, *Soviet Economic Development*, pp. 132-7.
[141]S. A. Billion, "Centralization of Authority and Regional Management," in *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective*, ed. by V. N. Bandera and Z. L. Melnyk (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 229.
[142]Ihor Gordijew and I. S. Koropeckyj, "Ukraine," in *Economics of Soviet Regions*, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj and Gertrude Schroeder, (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 284.

TABLE 2.2 Average Agricultural Employment as Percent of Total Population in the Ukrainian SSR, RSFSR, and USSR, 1950-75.

Year	Ukraine's Share of Total USSR Population	Ukrainian SSR	RSFSR	USSR
1950	20.5	30.4	27.7	28.5
-	-	-	-	-
1955	-	-	28.0	-
1956	-	-	27.6	-
1957	-	34.2	27.3	29.3
1958	-	34.0	26.4	29.2
1959	20.0	33.5	25.3	28.6
1960	-	32.7	24.3	26.6
1961	-	32.8	23.9	26.2
1962	-	32.2	23.9	26.0
1963	-	31.5	23.6	25.5
1964	-	31.8	23.8	25.6
1965	-	32.8	24.0	25.9
1966	-	32.9	24.2	26.2
1967	-	32.7	24.7	26.1
1968	-	32.7	24.5	25.8
1969	-	31.9	24.0	25.1
1970	19.5	30.9	23.2	24.5
1971	-	31.1	23.7	24.7
1972	-	31.5	23.8	24.9
1973	-	31.5	24.5	25.3
1974	-	32.0	24.9	25.7
1975	-	31.5	25.0	25.9
1979	19.0	-	-	-

Source: Table 2.4, Appendix, I. S. Koropeckyj and Gertrude W. Schroeder, ed. Economics of Soviet Regions (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 82 and 86.

availability of natural resources.

A closer look at Ukrainian agriculture reveals a number of imbalances that can be attributed to intensification and specialization. Agricultural intensification was emphasized by the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU in 1965 with the aim of obtaining greater efficiency land usage, capital, technical and labour resources. This required the agricultural ministry, including the collective and state farms, to intensify their efforts to bring about agricultural specialization.[143] While this strategy, which was reaffirmed by the October 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee, may not necessarily be a bad economic decision in itself, in Ukraine it led to excessive specialization on the field crop sector. Thus, in 1970 more than 80 percent of Ukraine's agricultural land was under cultivation -- more than in any other republic of the USSR. In that year Ukraine produced 67.5 percent of corn, 48.8 of sugar beets, and 32.4 percent of wheat production in the USSR (See Table 2.3). As a consequence there was a reduction in the size of hayfields and pasture lands. This meant that the livestock sector would have to rely largely on field crops which, in turn, caused the livestock sector itself to undergo its own degree of specialization because most livestock requires ample space to graze. Consequently, Ukraine has intensified the production of hogs.[144] The availability of local corn allowed for a high proportion of hog breeding -- 30.7 percent of the USSR's total in 1970. On the other hand, the proportion of the grazing livestock was greatly reduced. One of the consequences of this development was the reduction of horse breeding in Ukraine. Ukraine accounts for only 17.5 percent of the USSR's total number of horses, a very small ratio considering that Ukraine lags begind the USSR by one-third in the supply of motor power per agricultural worker. The Ukrainian farmer, who had less access to mechanized farm equipment, now also had to do with less animal power. Considering that Ukraine produces more than 30 percent of the total wheat in the USSR, adequate supplies of both horses and mechanization are a necessity if Ukraine's farms are to operate at full capacity and be economically efficient. [145]

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[143]*Pravda*, October 3,1968, cited by Ihor Stebelsky, "Ukrainian Agriculture: The Problems of Specialization and Intensification in Perspective," in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1975), p. 107.
[144]In 1970 Ukraine produced 30.7 percent of the USSR's hogs, while only 6.3 percent of the sheep, 7.3 percent goats and 17.5 percent horses. *Selskoe khoziastvo SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 251-274, cited by Stebelsky, "Ukrainian Agriculture," ibid., p. 108.
[145]Ibid., p. 107.

TABLE 2.3 Field Crops and Area Planted, 1970.

	USSR	Ukrainian SSR	
	(1,000 ha.)	(1,000 ha.)	(Percent of USSR)
All field crops	206,655	32,782	15.9
All grain	119,261	15,518	13.0
Winter wheat	18,055	5,960	32.2
Spring wheat	46,725	70	0.2
Rye	10,020	833	8.3
Corn for grain	3,353	2,262	67.5
Barley	21,297	3,370	15.8
Oats	9.250	881	9.5
Millet	2,691	521	19.4
Buckwheat	1,879	364	19.4
Pulses	5,070	1,280	25.3
Technical crops	14,486	3,939	27.2
Sugar beets	3,368	1,659	48.8
Sunflowers	4,777	1,710	35.8
Flax (fibre)	1,284	230	17.9
Potatoes	8,064	1,988	24.7
Vegetables	1,499	466	31.1
Fodder crops	62,846	10,733	17.1
Silage corn	18,010	4,465	24.8
Root and melon	1,800	713	39.6
Annual grasses	17,959	3,421	19.0
Perennial grasses	21,725	1,947	9.0
Fruit tree and berry plantings	3,848	1,243	32.3

Source: Ihor Stebelsky, "Ukrainian Agriculture: The Problems of Specialization and Intensification in Perspective," in Ukraine in the Seventies, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1975), p. 107.

The decisions to specialize and intensify Ukraine's agriculture were made by the central planners in Moscow and their policies have not been conducive towards well balanced agricultural development in Ukraine. Most of the production is exported as grain and vegetables, i.e. primary products and not as processed food. The reduction of hayfields and pasturelands, as well as the under-mechanization of an area which provides a very large percentage of agricultural output, indicates economic discrimination and contributes to Ukraine's economic dependency within the USSR. Economic dependence, as defined by Dos Santos is a:

> ...situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of the expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.[146]

Had Ukraine been politically autonomous, decisions could have been made to diversify agriculture and institute a more balanced development of this sector of the economy, all of which would have led to greater prosperity for the republic.[147]

Industry

The industrial sector of an internal colony is characterized by narrow specialization since the colony concentrates on the export of primary products. In addition, industry in the periphery is spatially confined to relatively compact areas in contrast to the core's diversified industrial base. Regional specialization and the spacial distribution of industry are tasks allotted to central planners by the Soviet economic decision-making structure. Central planners determine "the place of a region in the national and international division of labour" supposedly taking into account "the most efficient use of natural and economic conditions for the production of a commodity for the national and international markets."[148]

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[146]Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review* 60 (May 1970):231-36.
[147]See Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 92.
[148]I. V. Nikolskii, "The Role of Economic Sectors in the formation of Regional Production Complexes," *Soviet Geography: Review and Translations* (January 1972):17, quoted in Leslie Dienes, "Minerals and Energy," in *The Ukraine Within the USSR*, p. 156.

One of the best methods for determining the degree of specialization and for analysing the general balance of production and distribution of output in all sectors of the economy is through the use of input-output tables. Unfortunately, however, Soviet authorities are reluctant to publish these tables. In the case of Ukraine the most extensive publication of input-output tables was for the year 1966, and they provide valuable information on Ukraine's position within the USSR.[149] Table 2.4, showing Ukraine's imports and exports for 1966, was prepared on the basis of such input-output information. Imports and exports in this table include both inter-regional and international flows. This table brings to light two important aspects: Firstly, that in 1966 Ukraine had a favourable balance of trade - the share of exports in total production was greater than those of imports in total consumption - a desirable situation for the economy of any country. Secondly, exports, as a percentage of Ukraine's production, were largely primary manufactured products, which are simply natural resources that have been converted into a usable state. Primary manufacturing includes metallurgy (29.8 percent of republic production for 1966), chemical products (27.1 percent), food products (22.6 percent) and fuel (27.1 percent). About the only major export which was neither a natural resource nor primary product was the category of machine building and metal working (29.3 percent). In terms of imports, as a percent of republic consumption, Ukraine brought in a large amount of manufactured goods, especially, in wood and paper (44.4 percent), textiles and apparel (36.2 percent), and machine building and metal working (25.2 percent).

In 1973 Ukraine still produced 56 percent of the Soviet share of iron ore with much of this exported beyond the borders of the USSR. This was also the case with manganese ore: Ukraine produced more than 80 percent of Soviet demand and contributed about 50 percent of all manganese exported.[150] On the other hand, imports were largely consumer goods consisting of light and precision machinery and synthetic products, which, in the final analysis produce faster returns on investment for the region manufacturing these goods and generally require greater labour skills and more advanced technology.[151]

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[149]James Gillula, "Input-Output Analysis," in *The Ukraine within the USSR*, pp. 192-94. For a detailed account of the 1966 input-ouput tables see Guillula pp. 193-234.
[150]Dienes, "Minerals and Energy," p. 163.
[151]Ibid., p. 167.

TABLE 2.4 Structure of Imports and Exports in Ukraine, 1966 (Percent).

Aggregate Branch	Exports		Imports	
	As Percent of Total Exports	As Percent of Republic Production	As Percent of Total Imports	As Percent of Republic Consumption
Metallurgy	13.8	29.8	3.4	8.4
Fuels	6.6	21.7	6.9	20.3
Machine building and metalworking	23.9	29.3	21.9	25.2
Power	0.4	5.1	0.4	4.1
Chemical products	4.9	27.1	7.1	32.4
Wood and paper	0.7	6.3	10.1	44.4
Construction materials	0.2	0.1	4.5	17.1
Glass and porcelain	0.3	11.5	0.2	6.5
Textiles and apparel	5.2	10.6	28.1	36.2
Food products	33.6	22.6	11.6	8.2
Industry N.E.C.	3.3	37.1	2.3	27.4
Industry total	92.9	21.9	96.5	20.5
Agriculture and forestry	7.1	4.9	2.6	1.7
Other branches	0.0	0.0	0.9	14.9
Total material products	100.0	14.8	100.0	13.3

Note: N.E.C.= not elsewhere classified.

Source: James W. Gillula, "Input-Output Analysis," in The Ukraine Within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 212.

The spatial distribution of industry in Ukraine reflects the republic's status as an internal colony. The fairly densely populated Western regions of Ukraine continue to have low levels of industrialization because the only viable industries that could be located there -- consumer and light engineering -- remain seriously underdeveloped in the republic. Examining the southwest and western economic regions, with 44 percent of Ukraine's population, we find that only Kiev and Lviv have developed an engineering industry.[152] As seen in Map 1, the eastern regions of Ukraine continue to be, as they were in tsarist times, the prime locus of industry. In 1967 only four of Ukraine's 25 oblasts had industrial fixed assets per capita that exceeded the mean for the republic while 11 oblasts, accounting for 30 percent of the population, had an industrial level which was less than 60 per cent of the Ukrainian average.

According to Leslie Dienes, the highly specialized resource extractive industry, spatially confined and geographically imbalanced, has had a number of detrimental effects on Ukraine's economy.[153] The emphasis on a capital intensive, heavy industrial complex has led to the undercapitalization of other industrial sectors by making investment funds unavailable. By stressing low-value producing primary industries, which in future will undoutedly undergo resource depletion, there has been a rapid decline of capital productivity:

> Between 1960 and 1972, capital productivity in Ukraine declined much faster than in the Soviet Union as a whole and slightly faster even than in the Russian republic, despite the vast scope of Siberian projects in the latter (relative to base of 100 in 1960, the respective indexes in 1972 were 83, 92, and 84).[154]

It should also be noted that long standing specialization in industries, which rely heavily on the consumption of fuel and power, seriously strain the supply of energy. For example, the steel industry and power stations alone consumed 60 percent of Ukraine's fuel in 1972. Thus, Ukraine faces the serious problems of a relatively uneconomical energy mix (dominated by coal), increasing energy shortages, as well as high costs associated with energy extraction. The problems are further compounded by the fact that Ukraine is not rich in oil. As Dienes noted:

> Like the problem of the industrial structure in general, it has also a geographic

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[152]Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Some Realities in the Economic Integration of East Central Europe," *Studies for a New Central Europe*, 3-4 (1973/74):87-97.
[153]See Dienes, "Minerals and Energy," pp. 167-90.
[154]Ibid., p. 169.

MAP 1 Index of Industrialization in Ukraine, 1965-68 (Percent of USSR average).



Source: Leslie Dienes, "Minerals and Energy," in The Ukraine Within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 158.

> expression, shown by the huge differences in per capita fuel and energy consumption among the Ukrainian regions, with some 50 percent of the republic having indexes below the Central Asian level.[155]

To conclude, the role assigned Ukraine in the All-Union division of labour has resulted in a low level of profitability of the republic's industry. This is because so much of that industry is dominated by older, low value sectors, such as mining and metallurgy, which, unlike manufacturing, yield poor returns on investment. The preponderance of this capital-intensive, spatially confined industry has also resulted in the underutilization of labour and has retarded economic development in more than 50 percent of Ukraine. There is little evidence to show that central planners intend to diversify Ukraine's industrial base in the near future, even though the development of the more labour intensive industries such as light engineering, automobile and consumer products would solve some of the problems. [156] Indeed, it appears that central planners' investment decisions have not only failed to diversify Ukraine's economy, but recently, they have even contributed towards a decline of Ukraine's existing industry. Indeed, Party leaders of the industrialized Donetsk oblast have complained that authorities in Moscow have withheld funds needed to modernize Donetsk's coal mines.[157] Lacking economic autonomy, the republic has been unable to utilize its resources to achieve a more balanced economic profile. One of the reasons for this predicament is the transfer of resources out of Ukraine with no apparent benefit to the republic, which is our next subject.

Capital Formation and Financial Arrangements

Capital formation is a major determinant of economic growth and development. In the USSR the way that capital is generated and allocated reflects not only economic policy, but also the social, economic, and political priorities of its decision makers.[158] In assessing Ukraine's capital formation and the capital withdrawls made by the central government through the budgetary system, Z. L. Melnyk has shown the extent of Ukraine's contribution to Soviet economic development, from 1959 to 1970, and has concluded

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[155]Ibid.
[156]Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Scherbytskyi, Ukraine, and Kremlin Politics," *Problems of Communism* 32 (July-August, 1983):13.
[157]Ibid., p. 18.
[158]Z. L. Melnyk, "Capital Formation and Financial Relations," in *The Ukraine Within the USSR*, p. 268.

that an excessive burden has been imposed on the population of Ukraine.[159]

Because Ukraine's budget is included within the consolidated state budget of the USSR, it is necessary to carry out special calculations to determine the exact nature of the financial arrangements between Ukraine and the central government.[160] However, another way of gaining information on the size of the transfer payments between Ukraine and Moscow is through an examination of the turnover tax revenues. Turnover tax is the single largest source of revenue in the USSR's budget. It is collected by the state and local authorities from industrial, agricultural and business enterprises in the form of rents and charges on surplus income, and indirectly from consumers as part of the retail price of goods purchased. Though Soviet authorities deny this, turnover tax is similar to a sales tax. Between 1959 and 1970, a period for which data are available, Ukraine provided 35.9 percent of all budgetary revenue in the USSR. This amount represented 19 percent of Ukraine's national income.[161] The full impact of turnover tax in Ukraine becomes significant when taken into consideration with Soviet pricing policy.

Prices for the products of extractive and heavy industries were traditionally set at low levels, at times, even below production cost levels. This pricing policy was designed to encourage industrial expansion. The difference between the costs of production and the end prices were recouped by the government through a turnover tax on retail prices for consumer goods. This meant that prices for consumer goods were inflated (including cost of production as well as return on investment), while capital goods were sold at below cost prices.

Such pricing policy exploited Ukraine because the republic paid more than its share in taxes and because Ukraine traditionally supplied only limited types of capital goods (heavy machinery), natural resources and foodstuffs (see Table 2.1); and had to import almost all of its finished products, many of which were manufactured from raw materials and agricultural products produced in Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine received much less for its exports and paid more for its imports; the difference between the two sums, i.e. the surplus, returned to the central government for redistribution.[162] Melnyk states that in this way substantial funds were transferred from Ukraine to other parts of the USSR on a

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[159]Ibid., p. 269.
[160]Ibid., p.271.
[161]Ibid.
[162]Ibid., p. 272.

noncompensatory basis. Needless to say, Ukraine's population was not consulted about this arrangement. Thus, Ukraine suffered an irrevocable loss to its economy which resulted in a lower standard of living for its population.[163] I. S. Koropeckyj, has also analysed transfers of national income by the central government made through the state budget.[164] Based on the published materials of several Soviet and Western economists, Koropeckyj has studied the economic relations between Ukraine and Russia that have spanned over the past one hundred years and has conclusively shown that in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, Ukraine "consistently paid substantially more to the state budget than it received from it."[165]

Koropeckyj states that under tsarism, Ukraine, on the average, contributed about 20 percent towards Russia's total budget receipts, but received only 13 percent in return payments.[166] A similar trend is also evident under Soviet rule. Investments in Ukraine are controlled by Moscow and Ukraine has received far fewer funds than has the RSFSR.[167] "In relation to budget receipts, outflow in terms of budgetary surplus...during the 1920s [was] between 11 and 23 percent, during the 1960s, slightly over 30 percent."[168] These funds were transferred without interest payments or any promise of repayment, as would be the case when normally making loans. While it can be argued that money transferred out of Ukraine was needed to help equalize the economies of lesser developed regions of the USSR, the fact remains that on the basis of economic rationality, the money would have been best invested in Ukraine. As a result of the constant drain on Ukraine's budget, productivity growth of industry in Ukraine by the mid-1960s began to lag behind that of industry in Russia and the Soviet Union as a whole. Because of inadequate investments, Ukraine's economy, could not meet new technological requirements and the republic lagged behind Russia in this respect.[169]

The model of internal colonialism appears to apply to Ukraine. Ukraine's economy is highly specialized and is largely dependent on the production of a narrow segment of agriculture and heavy industry. The great majority of its exports are primary products

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[163]Ibid., pp. 287-89.
[164]I. S. Koropeckyj, "A Century of Moscow-Ukraine Economic Relations: An Interpretation," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5 (December 1981):467.
[165]Ibid., p. 470.
[166]Ibid.
[167]Ibid., p. 479.
[168]Ibid., p. 473.
[169]Ibid., p. 478-79.

geared for export, while most imports are manufactured goods. Because of excessive budgetary transfers out of Ukraine, the growth of its economy has been constricted. Moscow's economic policy has failed to bring about equality. However, the persistence of economic inequality is insufficient to establish Ukraine as an internal colony, even though many aspects of daily life are certainly connected to one's economic well-being. Other facets of internal colonialism include poor educational opportunities and inaccessibility to administrative positions, as well as a rather specific pattern of migration. These social factors are discussed below.

C. Society in Soviet Ukraine

Urbanization

Urbanization is an important indicator of modernization. It reflects the level of a society's socio-economic development, specifically its industrialization, since with industrial development workers migrate to urban centres in search of employment. Urbanization also provides major opportunities for social mobility, that is, the shift in occupation between generations as well as the occupational shift within a single generation. As a rule, social mobility implies upward movement from a lower status occupation to a higher one. It can also encompass downward and lateral movement which in itself can show important aspects of a society's modernization process. Wsevolod Isajiw writes:

> Various political and cultural processes of modern times have been related to the processes of urbanization and social mobility. The latter provide a social base for the former and can indicate the direction which political and social processes may take. Thus, movements such as nationalism, communism, socialism and capitalism, as well as modern movements toward cultural renaissance, ethnic identity, etc., have, as their social base, urbanization processes and social mobility of various sectors of society.[170]

In an internal colony these two processes -- urbanization and social mobility -- have developed distinct patterns not evident in regions whose development has been endogenous. The placement and functioning of cities in internal colonies is such that they serve the needs of the metropolis better than those of their own region. Accessibility

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[170]Wsevolod Isajiw, "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Soviet Ukraine," p. 58.

between the cities within the periphery is often not as easy as between them and metropolitan urban centres. An analysis of the social structure of the periphery reveals an ethnic specialization in jobs with members of the core population occupying a disproportionate share of top positions.

In examining urban development in Ukraine we will focus on two aspects. Firstly, the degree of urbanization. Here comparisons will be drawn with the Russian republic. Secondly, the population of urban centres will be examined and aspects such as the ethnic composition of towns and cities, urban job allocations and residential patterns will be highlighted.

In the USSR urban communities are classified into cities and towns. A town must have over 1000 inhabitants of whom 60 percent must be employed in non-agricultural activites. A city, on the other hand, must have a minimum population of 2000 persons with 75 percent engaged in non-agricultural pursuits.[171] Ukraine's rate of urbanization (i.e. the percentage of the population living in urban centres) progressively increased over the past several decades, a common trend in any modernizing society. But when compared to the rate of urbanization in the RSFSR, Ukraine's rate of increase has lagged behind. Indeed, in 1913 the degree of urbanization in Ukraine exceeded that of Russia's, by 1939 Ukraine and Russia had the same level of urbanization, but by 1959 the Russian republic had noticeably surpassed Ukraine (see Table 5). Analyzing the rate of Ukraine's urban development, Peter Woroby found that if Ukraine had kept pace with the Russian rate of urbanization, it would have had an additional 3.7 million urban inhabitants in 1970.[172] Woroby has also found that Russian towns and cities were 38 percent larger than their Ukrainian counterparts.[173] Moreover, in Ukraine there also exists a very uneven regional pattern in the location of urban centers. The southeastern regions (Donetsk, Voroshylovhrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Crimea and Zaporizhzhia) have a higher concentration of urban communities than do the regions west of the Odessa-Kiev axis and this, as could be expected, parallels the location of industries (see Map 1). However, this also indicates that the pattern of distribution of urban centres has remained largely unchanged from tsarist

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[171]*Ukrainska radianska entsyklopedia* (Kiev, 1959-65)9:238-40, 13:33; *Entsyklopedia narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1972), 4:50.
[172]Peter Woroby, "Effects of Urbanization in the Ukraine," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 13 (1973-77):113.
[173]Ibid., p. 114.

TABLE 2.5 Urbanization in Ukraine, Russia and the RSFSR, 1913 - 1980.

	1913		1939		1959		1970		1980[1]	
	Ukraine	Russia	Ukraine	RSFSR	Ukraine	RSFSR	Ukraine	RSFSR	Ukraine	RSFSR
Urban Population (1000)	6,790	15,667	13,569	36,295	19,147	61,611	25,689	80,981	32,676	100,445
Rural Population (1000)	28,420	74,235	26,900	72,082	22,722	55,923	21,438	49,098	19,801	42,197
	35,210	89,902	40,469	108,377	41,869	177,534	47,127	130,079	52,477	142,642
Urban Growth Rate (%)[2]		-	2.70	3.28	1.74	2.68	2.71	2.52	2.44	2.18
Rural Growth Rate (%)		-	-0.21	-0.11	-0.85	-1.28	-0.53	-1.19	-0.80	-1.53
Total Growth Rate (%)			0.54	0.72	0.17	0.41	1.08	0.93	1.08	0.93
Degree of Urbanization (%)	19.3	17.4	33.5	33.5	45.7	52.4	54.5	62.3	62.3	70.4
Surplus Deficit (1000)	654.0	-1670.0	16.0	-43.0	-2,800.0	7,861.0	-3,650.0	10,075.0	-4,278.0	11,621.0
vs. rural population (%)	2.3	-2.3	0.1	-0.1	-12.3	14.1	-17.0	20.5	-21.6	27.5

[1]Estimated Projections.
[2]Calculated on the annual basis.

Source: Peter Woroby, "Effects of Urbanization in the Ukraine," The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. 13 (1973-77):56-57.

times. Urbanization is related to industrial development and the lack of urban outlets is indicative of a low level of economic development.[174] The urbanization process in Ukraine shows the consequences of economic discrimination. Moreover, the urbanization gap between Ukraine and Russia has widened. This situation, as well as the pattern of the location of cities, is typical of an internal colony.

Turning to the ethnic composition of Ukraine's urban population it should be noted that the Russian share of Ukraine's total population increased steadily between 1959 and 1979, while the Ukrainian portion decreased (see Table 2.6). What is of particular significance here is the fact that most of the increase in Ukraine's Russian population was due to Russian in-migration and that a high proportion of these migrants settled in the cities. Russians constitute over 30 percent of Ukraine's urban population, Ukrainians about 60 percent, or roughly 15 percent less than their share of the total population. Russians have also tended to settle in the larger urban centres, thus in Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk, the Russian share of the population is closer to fifty percent.[175] Isajiw states that:

> In all societies, it is the city which provided the most opportunities for social mobility since it becomes a centre of industrial growth and a nexus for economic and governmental development, for cultural creativity and for new social patterns. As such it is a source of rising expectations and career aspirations. There is a relationship between career aspirations and urbanization: the higher the career aspirations of the population, the greater the urban migration both from rural to urban areas and also from small towns to larger cities.[176]

In Ukraine, the cities must absorb more than their own migrating population, they must also accomodate a large Russian influx. Isajiw contends that in competition with the Russians, Ukrainians are at a disadvantage and that in all likelihood the disadvantages will increase in the future. These disadvantages arise from six factors: imbalances in the level of education, predominance of Russians in certain professions, the social background of migrants moving into Ukrainian cities, residential stability, natural growth rate of the Ukrainian population, and finally, the privileged position afforded Russians in Ukraine and for that matter throughout the entire USSR. It is to these factors that we will now turn.

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[174]Ibid., p. 51.
[175]Ibid., p. 60.
[176]Isajiw, "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Soviet Ukraine," p. 60.

TABLE 2.6 Ethnic Composition of Ukraine, 1959 - 1979 (In Percent).

	1959		1970		1979			
	Total in Population (in 1000)	Percent of Total Population	Total in Population (in 1000)	Percent of Total Population	Total in Population (in 1000)	Percent of Total Population	Percent Change 1959-1970	Percent Change 1970-1979
Ukrainians	32,158	76.8	35,284	74.9	36,489	73.6	12.6	5.3
Russians	7,091	16.9	9,126	19.4	10,472	21.1	9.7	3.4
Others	2,619	6.3	2,716	5.7	2,648	5.3	28.7	14.7
TOTAL	41,869	100.0	47,127	100.0	49,609	100.0	-	-

Source: Radio Liberty Research 100/80, March 11, 1980, p. 4.

Social Mobility and Stratification

In an internal colony there exists a specialization of occupations with core members holding high-status positions, leaving members of the periphery to occupy the less prestigious posts. The in-migration of a large number of educated Russians into Ukraine's cities became an important way in which Ukrainians were relegated to lower status positions in their republic. Russians moving into Ukraine were a highly mobilized group: the majority of them came from towns (74 percent), had far more skills, and were better educated than Ukrainian migrants (over half of whom were of a rural background).[177] Moreover, Russian migrants were more inclined to remain in a city once they moved there than were Ukrainians. In 1967, for instance, 76.6 percent of the Ukrainians that came to Kiev moved out within a year, while in the case of Russian migrants the figure was 55 percent. Thus Russian migrants exhibited greater residential stability. A number of factors account for this. To begin with, the city can be very alien to a rural person who is less equipped to cope with the sophistication of urban life. Secondly, Ukrainians had substantially less education than the Russians and therefore had difficulties in securing suitable employment. Finally, to live in the larger cities one requires special permission from authorities (*propuska*). It is fairly well-known that many Ukrainians working in Kiev are forced to commute from surrounding villages because they cannot secure the required permission. On the other hand, between 1959 and 1970 almost one million Russians migrated to Ukraine. "Judging by complaints which appeared in the unofficial literature, Russian immigrants obtained better positions and housing. They arrived with the confidence that the superior standing of Russians throughout the USSR gave them."[178] The Russian migration to Ukraine did not resemble immigrants that one finds in most other countries in the world -- newcomers moving into subordinate positions in the host society. Hechter refers to this particular kind of population movement, i.e. where core members move to the periphery and occupy high status positions in the social structure, as selective migration. He claims that, in fact, this selective migration is initially responsible for the establishment of a cultural division of labour in the periphery.[179]

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[177]Ibid., pp. 62-63.
[178]Krawchenko, "Social Mobilisation and National Consciousness," p. 298.
[179]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 90.

The underdevelopment of higher education in Ukraine is another obstacle in the social mobility of Ukrainians. In the Soviet context educational attainment influences the type of occupation one can secure. As the Soviet sociologist Iu. Arutiunian has written, "the most important factor for the analysis of social structure, apart from economic status, is the standard of education."[180] Data for the 1960-1 and 1966-7 academic years show that Ukrainians were uderrepresented within the total student population attending Soviet institutions of higher learning (see Table 2.7). Indeed, on a per capita basis Ukraine had fewer students than the Soviet average (see Table 2.8). In terms of this criterion Ukraine ranked 14th out of the 15 titular republics of the USSR (1970). [181] This situation had serious implications for the social mobility of Ukrainians as can be seen from data on the class structure of Ukraine. As late as 1959, the majority of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR were collective farmers (see Table 2.9). Although by 1970 the working class had emerged as the majority group in the class structure of Ukrainians, on a comparative basis, Ukrainians' class structure was still marked by sharp inequalities. As for white-collar staff, in 1939 the representation of this group in the social structure of Russia was 1.4 percent greater than in Ukraine. By 1970, however, the gap widened to 3.7 percent (see Table 2.10). Social structural convergence predicted by diffusion theorists had not occurred.

In accounting for the poor performance of Ukrainians in attaining higher education, social discrimination has to be stressed. Data show that the vast majority of students attending institutions of higher learning in Ukraine are the offspring of parents in the white-collar group. What is characteristic about this group in Ukraine is that Russians are heavily overrepresented in it -- they formed almost half of the total number of white-collar staff in Ukraine (1970).[182] In 1960 (the latest year for which such data are available), only 48.3 percent of the total number of scientists in Ukraine were Ukrainian by nationality.[183] Thus the class bias in education affected Ukrainians in their own republic more deeply than it did Russians living there. Ukrainians are also disadvantaged because of the Russification

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[180]Yu. Arutyunayan, "Rural Social Structure," in *Town, Country and People*, ed. G. V. Osipov (London: Tavistock Publications, 1969), p. 241.
[181]Krawchenko, "Social Mobilisation and National Consciousness," p. 472.
[182]Ibid., p. 475-76.
[183]In raw figures this means that of 46,657 scientific workers in Ukraine only 22,523 or 48 percent, were of Ukrainian background. 1960 seems to be the latest year for which such data are available. Isajiw, "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Ukraine," p. 62.

TABLE 2.7 Share of Ukrainians and Russians in Student Enrolment in the USSR.

% of Total Soviet Population			As % of Total Student Population in Higher Education			Representation	
Year	Ukrainians	Russians	Year	Ukrainians	Russians	Ukrainians	Russians
1959	17.8	54.6	1960-61	14.3	61.8	-3.5	7.2
1970	16.9	53.4	1966-67	14.3	60.5	-2.6	7.1

Source: Wsevolod Isajiw, "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Soviet Ukraine," Canadian Slavonic Papers 27 (March 1980):61.

TABLE 2.8 Student Enrolment in Higher Education in the USSR, 1976-77. (Per 10,000 Population).

	Ukraine	RSFSR	Soviet Union
Institutions of higher education	171	214	192
Secondary specialized institutes	163	201	179

Source: Ibid.

TABLE 2.9 Class Structure of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR (In Percent).

	1939*	1959*	1970**
Working class	29.0	34.0	47.0
White-collar staff	13.0	13.0	16.0
Collective farmers	58.0	53.0	37.0
Ukrainians	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Includes dependents. ** Economically active population only.

Source: Bogdan A. Krawchenko, "Social Mobilisation and National Consciousness in 20th Century Ukraine," (Ph.D. Dissertation, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1982), p.446.

TABLE 2.10 A Comparison of Changes in the Class Structure of Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, 1939 and 1970 (In Percent)*

	1939			1970**		
	Working class	White-collar staff	Collective farmers	Working class	White-collar staff	Collective farmers
Ukraine	32.6	17.2	48.7	51.5	20.6	27.7
Russia	35.0	18.6	43.7	61.3	24.3	14.3
U.S.S.R.	32.5	17.7	47.2	56.7	22.6	20.5

*Includes dependents. **1970 data exclude territories acquired after 1939.

Source: Ibid.

of higher education. The majority of Ukrainian students gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Yet most higher educational establishments in Ukraine use Russian as the language of instruction.[184] Indeed, fluency in Russian is not only an entrance requirement, but also most entrance exams are conducted in that language. Thus Ukrainians are placed at a relative disadvantage when compared to their Russian counterparts.

It is, of course, true that the social structure of Ukrainians has experienced modernization during the last half a century. Ukrainians are more highly urbanized today than in the past, there are fewer collective farmers and more industrial workers in their midst. What is important to note for the purpose of this discussion, however, is that Ukrainians' relative position within the system of social stratification has remained unaltered. In the social pyramid, Ukrainians still occcupy the lowest status occupations, their mobility has tended to be lateral, rather than upward. In some cases, as we have seen, their *relative* standing *vis-a-vis* Russians is indeed worse today than it was some decades ago. What exists, to use Hechter's term, is a "cultural division of labour."

Finally, let us consider other aspects characteristic of society in an internal colony, namely a persistently lower standard of living and substandard social welfare. Turning to the first, Gertrude Schroeder has shown that the standard of living in Ukraine is lower than in the RSFSR or the USSR, for that matter. In terms of personal incomes, collective farmers and workers earned considerably less than their counterparts in both the RSFSR and USSR in 1960, 1965, and 1970 (years for which earnings could be calculated).[185] In 1974, Ukrainians consumed less milk, eggs and fish and relied more on the starch staples of potatoes and grains than did the citizens of the RSFSR. Thus Ukrainians' diet was generally of a lower quality, surprising in view of the agricultural importance of Ukraine. The per capita consumption of 'soft goods' such as textiles, was also below the USSR and RSFSR norm. Expenditures on health and physical culture was 39 rubles per capital in Ukraine in 1974, 10 percent below the RSFSR.[186] Ukraine's rate of mortality in general and infant mortality in particular was significantly higher than the figures for the Russian republic.[187] Between 1956 and 1973, as J. Dallenbrant concluded, the relative

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[184]See Krawchenko, "Social Mobilization and Nationall Consciousness," pp.476-85.
[185]Schroeder, "Consumption and Personal Incomes," in *The Ukraine Within the USSR*, p. 86.
[186]Ibid., p. 91.
[187]Ibid., p. 95.

differences between the republics of the USSR, including those between Ukraine and Russia, remained unchanged.[118]

D. Conclusion

Several features of internal colonialism are evident in Ukraine's socio-economic structure. Building on an initial advantage, inherited from the tsarist empire, there is much evidence to show that the Moscow government continues to exploit Ukraine materially. Protracted interaction between Ukraine and Russia has not resulted in an equalization of levels of socio-economic development, rather Ukraine has remained relatively disadvantaged. Even though Ukraine has good quality soil and propitious climatic conditions, its agricultural development has been distorted by the policies of the central government. The republic's industry remains unbalanced. Production is largely geared for export and is usually in the form of raw materials or primary manufactured goods with their lower prices. Ukraine imports higher priced secondary manufactured consumer goods. Its economy, therefore, is instrumental and complementary to that of Moscow's. The pattern found in the location of cities is also indicative of an internal colony. The large industrialized centres are confined to the eastern provinces of Ukraine and along the Black Sea coast, while the densely populated western provinces have had little industrial development.

Ukraine also posseses a social structure that resembles an internal colony. Ukrainians hold the low status jobs, while the Russians in Ukraine are overrepresented in the white collar and managerial positions. Russians have managed to maintain their preferential status enjoyed during tsarist rule in virtually every aspect of political, social and cultural life. This superiority is manifested in all aspects of Soviet life: Russian is the primary language of communication and higher education; Russians are overrepresented in the Communist Party, in government, in the ministries and secretariats, and in the administration of many republics.[119] The new social order -- one of greater equality -- promised by the Bolsheviks has not materialized. Thus, as long as Ukrainians retain their

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[118]Jan Ade Dellenbrant, "Regional Differences in the Soviet Union," (Research Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, Uppsala University, August 1977).
[119]See Borys Lewytzkyj, "The Ruling Party Organs of Ukraine," in *Ukraine In the Seventies*, pp. 267-82.

cultural distinctiveness, a basis for a cultural division of labour exists. Cultural distinctivenss is the next theme.

III. THE PERSISTENCE OF CULTURAL DISTINCTIVENESS IN UKRAINE

The second most important dimension of an the internal colony is the presence of cultural distinctivness. As discussed in Chapter One, structural functionalist theorists generally believe that cultural distinctiveness persists because there is a lack of interaction between core and periphery and as a result the periphery maintains its cultural integrity because of isolation. Official Soviet theorists contend "their society is moving toward the amalgamation of the nationalities," because of the integration of nationalities.[190] However, the internal colonial model posits that increased contact between core and periphery does not bring about cultural assimilation or core-periphery convergence as long as a cultural division of labour exists. Language, religion, art, observable customs and life-style are important cultural markers which regulate social life and are the identifiers upon which the cultural division of labour is based.

Hechter argues that because the peripheral population is confined to a range of subordinate social roles, it will tend to maintain its cultural institutions and identity. "This culture maintenance results from the importance of culture in the system of stratification and from the consequent tendencies towards ecological segregation in the work and residential settings."[191] Because of inequality, in time, a reactive nationalist movement, championing the minority language and culture will arise and the cultural markers will be maintained rather than shed. Studies have shown that among the national movements' most common characteristics are concern for the revival or maintenance of language, culture or religion.[192] The persistence of cultural distinctiveness in the periphery is made evident through the retention of the native language, religion and tradition. Quite often bilingualism becomes the norm amongst members of the indigenous population in the periphery and the core language is reserved for the workplace while the native language is used at home. The culture is maintained despite deliberate efforts by the central government to implement policies which are designed to encourage the periphery's

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[190]Zvi Gitelman, "Are Nations Merging in the USSR?" *Problems of Communism* 32 (September-October 1983):27.
[191]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 344.
[192]Ibid., 166-67.

acceptance of the core culture and the ultimate creation of a dominant national culture.[193] A strong central authority takes steps to create a milieu which encourages assimilation through the manipulation of cultural symbols and values, use of the communications media and even through the deployment of military force.[194] Disseminators of the cultural symbols have historically been ecclesiastical and educational institutions.[195]

This chapter will examine the struggle to maintain Ukraine's unique cultural, linguistic and religious identity. Some theoretical, social and attitudinal problems concerning language will also be explored. Our discussion of theory will highlight the views of Western linguists, the Soviet position, as well as Hechter's ideas on linguistic affiliation in internal colonies. Examining the social dimension, we will focus on the role of the Ukrainian language in schools, business, government, mass media, publishing and in private life. Finally, the attitudinal aspect on the language issue will be explored by an analysis of Ukraine's linguistic maintenance, as well as by looking at some of the demands raised by the Ukrainian intelligentsia, political elite and dissidents on the role of their native language in Ukrainian society. Even though religion has lost some of its salience in Soviet society, it can still be used as an important identifying characteristic distinguishing Ukrainians from Russians. Thus, the discussion on religion will briefly examine the role religion plays in an internal colony, the differences between the Ukrainian and Russian churches, the close interdependence of religion and nationalism in Ukrainian history, and the difficulties experienced by the Soviet leadership in its antireligious campaigns in Ukraine.

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[193]Ibid., p. 164.
[194]Ibid.
[195]Ibid., pp. 164-165.

A. Language

Language in Theoretical Perspective

Language serves a variety of related functions. Firstly, it is the most important medium of communication. Secondly, it is a symbol that links and binds individuals to a culturally distinct ethnic group, and is a marker which helps differentiate a group from other similar communities. Thus, even though Ukrainians and Russians may have common Slavic roots, their languages assist in differentiating one group from the other. Finally, language is an integral component of culture, and also serves as the medium through which other important cultural features are expressed. It is one of the most important and fundamental determinants of national identity. Consequently, loss of language can pose serious problems for the maintenance of an ethnic group's identity. Language identification can be weakened through dilution, that is, the introduction of many foreign words because the native language is insufficiently developed for the purposes of modern communication. When the status of one language is raised at the expense of another, the prestige of a language considered as "literary" will become greater than one seen as a "vulgar peasant dialect."[196] In such cases language identification is eroded because members of the lower status group may choose to learn the more prestigious language and thus, over time, come to see themselves as members of the other ethnic group. Language identification can be undermined permanently when the native language becomes extinct.

Western scholars such as Joshua Fishman and Karl Deutsch generally share the belief that with heightened interaction, through industrialization and urbanization, language assimilation will ultimately occur. In discussing language maintenance and shift, Fishman makes the generalization that the urban dweller is more prone to shift language than is the rural, more conservative and isolated dweller. But this point appears to contradict his other assertion, namely, that ethnic consciousness and nationalism are largely urban phenomena. He states that it is the urban environment that has given rise to movements striving to revive and sustain loyalty to a language and that to a great extent it is the urban

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[196]Kenneth Calvin Farmer,"Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalities Policy: 1957-72" (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977), p. 123.

intelligentsia and middle class which have been the prime carriers and organizers of movements stressing language maintenance.[197] With regard to bilingualism, Fishman realizes that to maintain a pattern of stability between two different languages at least two functionally distinct and important centres of social life are required, each relating to a specific language. These two centres are the home and the workplace. Thus, as long as the language is spoken at home it has chances at survival even though another language maintains dominance in the workplace.[198]

Linking the process of language change to that of social mobilization, Karl Deutsch finds that the weakening of traditional village bonds, exposure to mass communication and modern technology, and the development of new residential patterns, habits and expectations are ways in which identity is undermined. Assimilation, according to Deutsch, is accelerated if traditional ties are loosened through social mobilization. [199]

In its general outline, Soviet theory on language shift and language maintenance follows a similar line of argument. Examining linguistic and national relations in the Soviet Union, M. N. Guboglo, for example, lists five factors which lead to language shift: social-economic levels, size of contending language groups, dispersion or compactness of language groups, length of exposure of one group to another, and the degree of genealogical kinship of the language in question."[200] Both Western and Soviet theoreticians agree that urbanization is a major factor bringing about language shift or change. The common assumption is that language retention is largely an attachment to the rural setting, and that language change is mostly associated with urban life.[201]

In Hechter's view, the decline in the use of a language is not because of industrialization and mass communication but rather because of political decisions made by a strong central government.[202] In fact, he suggests that the political significance of cultural distinctions can increase as industrialization proceeds unless assimilation was

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[197]Joshua A. Fishman, "Language Maintenance and Language Shift as a Field of Inquiry: A Definition of the Field and Suggestions for its Further Development,"*Linguistics* 9 (November 1964): 32-70.
[198]Joshua A. Fishman, "The Sociology of Language," in *Language and Social Context*, ed. Pier Paolo Giglioli (London, 1978), pp. 51-4.
[199]Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 60 (September 1961):494.
[200]Cited by Stephen Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift Among Ukrainians" (Ph. D. dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, 1977), p. 5.
[201]Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities," *American Political Science Review* 68 (March 1974):48-51.
[202]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 167.

achieved very early. The government gains its authority through the manipulation of symbols. The disseminators of cultural symbols have historically been ecclesiastical and educational institutions, either established or appropriated by the state, which identify and enhance the legitimacy of the state. However, cultural institutions, such as a church or volunteer organizations, which develop independently of and in competition with state sponsored institutions may eventually become centres of political opposition because of their divergent interests.[203] In instances where there are questions involving choice of language of instruction, and when one language is given juridical rights at the expense of another, a politically charged situation can occur. Thus, members of the periphery with the determination to retain their native tongue, especially in an urban setting, may resent the high social cost they have to pay for cultural maintenance, costs which include blocked access into higher education, prejudice in judicial proceedings, or the inability to compete for higher or better paying positions.

In an internal colony the core group consciously and systematically imposes its own language, religious ideology, values and educational standards on the population of the periphery. In this way, the metropolitan area asserts its superiority. For the regional members, the situation is quite different. They are made to feel inadequate and incapable of obtaining high status positions unless they shed their own readily identifiable cultural traits. The core's cultural superiority is upheld and maintained through policy set out by central authorities. A major determinant of dominance by the core over a minority cultural or linguistic group is the extent to which the core controls the apparatus of central government. Consequently, cultural policies, such as those legitimating the use of particular religions or languages in national cultural institutions, are ultimately political in origin.

Ukrainian as a Language of Education and Communication in Soviet Ukraine

As has been stated in numerous official documents, the goal of the Communist Party is to make Russian the *lingua franca* for the entire USSR. Through the acceptance of Russian as the official, and second native-language by all the nationalities, the ultimate

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[203]Ibid., pp. 164-65.

goal of *sliianie* or the 'fusion' of all Soviet nations will be realized.[204] Until this idyllic situation is reached, however, official policy allows for the development of national languages as guaranteed by the 1961 Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and adopted by the Twenty-second Congress. The policy states that:

> The Party will continue promoting the languages of the peoples of the USSR and the full freedom for every citizen of the USSR to speak and educate his children in any language, without permitting any privileges, limitations or compulsions in the use of one language or another."[205]

In juxtaposition to this open acceptance of all the languages of the Soviet Union, is the strongly supported policy of bilingualism which emphasizes Russian as the common language for all citizens.[206] The official justification for such prominent status given to Russian is basically threefold: Firstly, the majority of the population of the USSR -- up to sixty per cent of the people -- uses it as its native tongue. Secondly, Russian is close to the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages, and these three East Slavic groups comprise almost 75 percent of the total inhabitants of the USSR. Thirdly, because Russian language and culture are held to be superior. Thus, one can read in the press frankly chauvinist statements claiming that "the Russian socialist nation has achieved the heights of worldwide science and culture, that the Russian language has created a completely unique...repository of the achievements of civilization... that the Russian language is itself an unusually rich and beautiful language, and finally, that Russian was the language of Vladimir Ilich Lenin."[207] This official justification for the pre-eminent position of Russian is part of a well planned process developed by the central government in Moscow to make the Russian language dominant in Ukraine, as well as in other union republics of the USSR.

Since the communist take-over of Ukraine, the Ukrainian language and culture have been subjected to varying degrees of official acceptability -- ranging from permissiveness during the liberal policy of Ukrainianization in the 1920s, to outright discrimination as reflected by the Russification policies of later years. In the early 1920s, an effort was

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[204]Krawchenko, "Social Mobilisation and National Consciousness," pp. 417-19.
[205]"The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, November 2, 1961, pp. 1-9; translation in Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow, eds., *Current Soviet Politics IV* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 62.
[206]See M. N. Guboglo, "Socioethnic Consequences of Bilingualism," *Soviet Sociology* 13 (Summer-Fall 1974):94.
[207]V. Kuznetsov, "The Language of International Discourse," *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 12, 1972, cited by Kenneth Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policies* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 125-6.

made by the Communist Party to 'Ukrainianize' party membership, government personnel, and most importantly, the educational system. However, the policies of this era were dramatically reversed when Stalin consolidated his leadership of the CPSU. In 1933 Ukrainianization was abandoned, and thousands of Ukrainian political, cultural and intellectual figures were purged. By the end of the 1930s Russian again returned to its position of prominence and status. [208] Under Khrushchev's leadership further strides were taken towards the linguistic Russification of Ukraine's educational and communication systems. The 1961 Party Programme strongly supported assimilationist tendencies through the encouragement of the study of the Russian language. This was justified as a positive step towards promoting cooperation among the national groups and allowing the non-Russian nations access to world cultures. In effect the policy stressed the Russian language as the "common medium of intercourse and cooperation between all the peoples of the USSR."[209] The 1961 Party policy remains virtually intact today and was reaffirmed just recently in *Pravda* which reported that the 27 May 1984 meeting of the Politburo raised the question of making increased efforts for the improvement of teaching the Russian language in all educational institutions of the union republics. [210]

Language policy for all the nationalities of the USSR is officially set by the Supreme Soviet under the direction of the Party and is administered at the union republic level by the respective ministries of education. That the policy effectively discriminates against the Ukrainian language is seen by the fact that Ukrainian is not the offical language in Ukraine, and that the language is discriminated against in the areas of education and publishing, as we discuss below.

Turning to education, the Russian language must be studied in all Ukrainian schools. Starting from the kindergarten level the number of hours of instruction in Russian per week increases with each grade level.[211] Instruction in Russian at the lower grades is crucial for the student who aspires to enter a post-secondary educational institution because the better institutes conduct, almost exclusively, their classes in Russian. Using

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[208]John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Ltd., 1968), pp. 18-21.
[209]Stephen Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift Among Ukrainians," p. 27.
[210]*Ukrainske Slovo* (Paris, France), 26 June 1983, p. 1.
[211]For a detailed account of the number of hours alotted to the teaching of Ukrainian and Russian from grades one to eleven, see John Kolasky, *Education in Ukraine*, pp. 64-65.

the study of economics as an example, a graduate student from a Ukrainian university intending to complete a doctorate degree must not only submit his documentation and application to defend his dissertation in Russian, he must also submit them to a special council in Moscow and, since 1976, the dissertaion itself must be written in Russian.[212] Consequently, parents wishing to provide their children with the best opportunities for upward mobility will insure that their children are fully bilingual. Interestingly enough, students of the RSFSR are not, by law, required to study a second language. From a very early stage the Ukrainian student is made aware that the Ukrainian language is of lower prestige and value than the Russian language.[213]

Khrushchev's 1958-59 school reforms, which no longer required teaching the indigenous language of the respective republics, entrenched the discrimination against the Ukrainian language. The reform proposed that Ukrainian not be a compulsory language in Russian schools located in Ukraine; a move which created considerable opposition within Ukrainian official circles. [214] At a meeting of Kiev's writer's union, a resolution was passed opposing the implementation of the reform but, as could be expected, to no avail. It is precisely this kind of a situation, a struggle for language retention, that is characteristic of an internal colony. Language became a hotly contested political issue and was the focal point of the national movement that emerged in Ukraine during the 1960s. In essence the reforms insured that most parents would opt for the Russian schools either because it would present better opportunities for the the future of their children or simply because of social pressures.[215] Table 3.1 shows the effects of Khrushchev's decision. In the years prior to the 1958/59 school year, there was little fluctuation in the number of Ukrainian language schools, but three years later the number of Ukrainian language schools decreased by 2.6 percent while the number of Russian schools increased. Thus, a decade after the reform there were 4.8 percent more Russian schools, whereas the number of Ukrainian schools decreased by a full 4 percent.

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[212]I. S. Koropeckyj, "The Economic Profession in Ukraine," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 13 (Number 35-36, 1973-76), p. 177.
[213]Farmer, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalism," p. 207.
[214]See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-1959 and Soviet Nationality Policy," pp. 138-157, for a discussion of the reforms. For a detailed account of the controversy and of the opposition that they provoked, see Krawchenko, "Social Mobilization and National Consciousness," pp. 483-87.
[215]Ibid., p. 204.

TABLE 3.1 Number of General Education Schools in Ukraine by Language of Instruction: 1953 to 1969.

Year	Total	Ukrainian	Russian	Mixed*	Others**
1953/54	29,551	25,192	4,027	55	277
1955/56	29,341	25,034	4,051	n.a.	256
1956/57	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	125	n.a.
1958/59	30,077	25,464	4,355	n.a.	258
1961/62, total	40,564	33,309	6,292	602	361
1961/62, day	31,098	25,747	4,705	403	243
1961/62, evening	9,466	7,562	1,587	199	118
1963/64	29,918	24,485	4,500	n.a.	n.a.
1968/69	28,541	23,036	5,505	n.a.	n.a.

n.a. = data not available.

*Mixed: Languages were either Ukrainian and Russian or Russian and Moldavian.
**Other: Either Moldavian, Hungarian or Polish.

Source: Stephen Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift Among Ukrainians in the Ukraine Since Stalin," (Ph. D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1977), p.226.

It is possible that the growing rate of urbanization has resulted in more students attending larger urban schools, necessitating the closure of rural schools, of which the greatest majority are Ukrainian.[216] However, this is difficult to prove because official Soviet statistics do not, as a matter of course, include the number of pupils attending each type of school. John Kolasky, who spent two years in a Ukraine, reports that Russian language schools have greater student populations than do Ukrainian schools, which are largely rural.[217]

An article by a Ukrainian dissident provides enrollment figures for 26 schools in two districts of Kiev for the early 1970s.[218] Of the 26 schools, ten were Ukrainian with a total enrollment of 6,360, or an average of 636 students per school. The remaining 16 schools were Russian with a total enrollment of 15,546, which is an average of 973 students per school. Thus, in the two districts Russian schools had twice the number of students.[219] In terms of curriculum and quality of education, the most revealing information is provided by Kolasky as well as by dissident sources. Kolasky states that many of the textbooks he examined were written in Russian and published in the RSFSR. In the case of art and physical education, there were no textbooks in Ukrainian. Some textbooks were written in Ukrainian but had Russianized forms of grammar and spelling. [220] In terms of teaching time, the number of hours allotted to teaching Ukrainian literature was 120 per school year, whereas for Russian it was 135 hours. With regard to financing education Kolasky writes:

> ...whereas the [Ukrainian republic] obtains a smaller share of the education budget than it rightly deserves it is not the Russian but Ukrainian schools that suffer; the former are larger, receive a disproportionate share of the budget and consequently occupy better buildings and are better equipped and better supplied...[221]

Dissident sources provide us with virtually the same kind of information. Ukrainian schools were poorly equipped, while Russian schools tended to have gyms, cafeterias, laboratories, audio-visual equipment and more qualified mathematics and physics teachers. Aware of these advantages, parents would quite willingly opt to send their children to the

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[216]Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift Among Ukrainians," p. 232.
[217]Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine*, pp. 51-52.
[218]*Ukrainskyi visnyk: vypusk VI* (Paris: Smoloskyp, 1972), pp. 66-72.
[219]Ibid.
[220]See Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine*, pp. 59-68; and, *Literaturna Ukraina*, October 20, 1967, p. 3.
[221]Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine, p. 52.*

Russian schools.

Based on these examples, it appears that the educational system works against the Ukrainian language in at least three important ways. Firstly, it diminishes the students' facility with the Ukrainian language. Secondly, it communicates a negative association with Ukrainian and a positive one with Russian. Finally, it appeals to the students' self-interest. As the student matures, he discovers that there are benefits attached to fluency in Russian and social stigma attached to knowing only Ukrainian.[222]

Aside from the social mobility gained through the mastery of Russian there is yet another advantage linked to the study of Russian -- that of geographical mobility. By elevating Russian to a status of universal language in the USSR, it is much easier to exchange workers, government personnel or officials from republic to republic. Therefore, migration becomes another useful method in facilitating Russification and assimilation. If Ukrainians move to other republics, Russian becomes the only language of communication (as it is the second language of instruction in all republics). While the decision to migrate is largely left up to the individual, there are certain indirect pressures, that make the idea of moving to another republic very attractive. For instance, the location of industry is a decision of the central authorities, and if local labour resources are insufficient, certain incentives, including higher pay, bonuses, travel expenses, and new living quarters are offered to attract the necessary personnel. The major reasons given by individuals and families for migrating revolve around opportunities of attaining better jobs and living conditions.[223] A more direct method that encourages moving is through planned resettlement of rural families. In 1973 a decree established financial benefits to families which chose to move to other regions and the more remote or least desirable the region, the greater the remunerations.[224] In addition, there are also legally binding transfers. The 1961 Party Programme called for educated young professionals and university graduates to work for a three year period in jobs which were assigned to them by a special commission of the Union-Republic Ministry of Higher Education. In most instances the commission saw to it that the graduate was not assigned to his or her own republic. [225]

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[222]Farmer, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalism," p. 204.
[223]V. V. Onikiienko and V. A. Popovkin, *Kompleksnoye issledovanie naseleniya USSR* (Moscow: Statistika, 1973), p. 100, cited by Rapawy,"Linguistic Shift," pp. 88-89.
[224]Ibid.
[225]Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness Among Ukrainians of

The effects of the Russified educational system and the encouraged and compulsory population transfers made it virtually essential for the non-Russian nationalities to become fluent in Russian. These conditions also made it considerably easier for Russians to move to Ukraine. Rather than become bilingual and learn Ukrainian, the immigrants could rely exclusively on Russian as a means of communication.

Publications and Electronic Media

Publishing is another area which is strongly influenced by Soviet language policies. In any milieu where more than one language predominates, the actual number of publications in a given language indicates the level of importance it attains through official recognition and the structuring of social opportunities for the speakers of the language.[226] There can be considerable variation in the production of books, journals, and press.[227] A comparison between the number of materials printed in Ukrainian and in Russian shows that there has been a decline in the publication of Ukrainian language books, journals, periodicals and newspapers, whereas the number of Russian publications has increased. From Table 3.2 we see that there was a serious decline in virtually every category of publications. Even though there was an increase in the total number of books actually published in Ukraine, only 27 percent of them were in the Ukrainian language.

Again, the question of quality must be taken into consideration. For example, if we compare two literary newspapers, the Russian-language *Literaturnaia gazeta* and the Ukrainian-language *Literaturna Ukraina*, major differences in content and level of sophistication become apparent. The Ukrainian paper is written at a fairly basic level, dealing largely with topics relating to literature and poetry, sometimes including materials of interest to librarians, elementary and occasionally high school teachers. The Russian paper, on the other hand, is much broader in scope and intellectually more stimulating. It deals with topics such as psychology, philosophy, urban and family life, scientific advances, demographic changes and political affairs. Given this, it is highly likely that the

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[225](cont'd) the Soviet Union," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 155.
[226]Brian D. Silver, "Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities," *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, ed., Jeremy R. Azrael (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 261.
[227]See Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, p. 459.

TABLE 3.2 Libraries and Publications in Ukraine, RSFSR and USSR.

	1965			1976			Percent Change		
	Ukraine	RSFSR	USSR	Ukraine	RSFSR	USSR	Ukraine	RSFSR	USSR
Public libraries	29,200	-	-	26,700	-	-	-8.6	-	-
Books:									
Total published	7,251	-	-	9,110	-	-	+25.6	-	-
in Ukrainian	2,998	-	3,003	2.494	-	2,495	-16.8	-	-16.9
in Russian	-	-	57,521	-	-	66,088	-	-	+14.8
Journals and periodicals:									
Total published	256	-	-	190	-	-	-25.8	-	-
in Ukrainian	108	-	-	109	-	-	+ 0.9	-	-
in Russian	-	2,603	-	-	3,672	-	-	+41.1	-
Newspapers:									
in Ukrainian	1,936	-	-	1,392	-	-	-28.1	-	-
in Russian	-	3,991	7,687	-	4,253	7,844	-	6.6	2.0

Source: Wsevolod Isajiw, Canadian Slavonic Papers 22 (March 1980) p. 64.

Russian paper has a greater circulation in Ukraine than the Ukrainian one.[228]

The presence of more reading materials in Russian than in Ukrainian, coupled with the fact that textbooks in Ukraine are predominantly in Russian (the higher the grade level the greater the proportion of Russian books used) raises the question of whether or not the Ukrainian living within his own republic has sufficient good quality, Ukrainian language literature that is easily accessible in order to maintain a strong attachment to his language. Stephen Rapawy attempts to answer this question through a comparison of the type, availability, quantity and quality of Russian literature provided for Russian language speakers with that which is available to the Ukrainian speaker.[229] He arrives at the conclusion that the Russian reader is indeed provided with more literature than his Ukrainian counterpart, in fact, three to four times more. True, there is an abundance of general literature and elementary and secondary school textbooks, but materials of a scientific, technical or political nature are published in Ukrainian in very limited quantities. This means that the professional or white-collar Ukrainian is increasingly forced to rely on Russian publications to maintain familiarity and competence within his field of study or work. This effectively produces almost an involuntary shift away from the Ukrainian language.[230]

Turning briefly to the electronic media, here too the Ukrainian language has been reduced to second place. A major portion of radio broadcasts are relayed from Moscow, and as such are in Russian. In addition all Ukrainian radio stations broadcast news from Moscow in Russian several times a day. With regard to television, since 1972 there have been two channels -- one from Moscow, broadcasting in Russian twelve hours per day, and one from Kiev, broadcasting only seven hours per day with some of that time being devoted to Russian language programs. In 1972, Ukrainian programs were broadcast throughout only 35 percent of Ukraine's territory. Crimea, for example, did not receive any Ukrainian brodcasting.[231] Moscow television has a much larger audience in Ukraine than

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[228]Roman Szporluk, "Russians in Ukraine and Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR," in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, p. 197.
[229]Stephen Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift Among Ukrainians in the Ukraine Since Stalin," pp. 117-54.
[230]Ibid., p. 155. Other studies that are available on the variety and quantity of books published can be found in Brian D. Silver, "Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities," pp. 250-306; and Zev Katz, *Handbook of Soviet Nationalities*.
[231]*The Ukrainian Herald, 7-8*, (Baltimore), 1976, no. 7-8: 87.

the Ukrainian language programmes because of better quality programmes.[232]

Public and Business Life

The last area to be discussed under the topic of the practical applications of the Ukrainian language is its use in business, government bureaucracy and the Communist Party. John Kolasky writes that the official language of communication and correspondence in business at all levels of governmental agencies, industrial enterprises, economic activities and in various public, youth and voluntary organizations is largely Russian. He provides numerous examples of offical forms, documents, public announcements and posters being used in Ukrainian institutions that are all written in Russian. Indeed, Ukrainian is rarely heard spoken on the streets of most major cities.[233]

From the foregoing discussion on the use of Ukrainian in education and communication it is clear that the Ukrainian language is being relegated to second place and is being superseded by Russian, which is quickly becoming the 'working language' for all people in Ukraine. This situation, where the language of the indigenous population in the periphery is superseded by the language of the core is typical to an internal colony. The policies, as set by the central Soviet government are designed to weaken Ukrainians' resistance to Russian. These types of policies also aid the process of assimilation in Ukraine.

Attitudes Toward the Ukrainian and Russian Languages

Linguistic Maintenance, Shift and Bilingualism

Data collected by the Soviet censes show that the percentage of total population of Ukraine indicating Ukrainian as their mother tongue declined from 73 percent in 1959, to 69.4 percent in 1970, and to 66.3 pecent in 1979. On the other hand, the population listing Russian as their native tongue has climbed from 24.3 percent in 1959, to 28.1 percent in 1970, to 31.2 percent in 1979 (see Table 3.3). A change is also evident in second language acquisition. In 1970 only 9.4 percent of the population claimed to know Ukrainian as their second language. In 1979 the figure climbed to 11.7 percent,

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[232]Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine and Ukrainians," pp. 34-35.
[233]John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1970), pp. 25-43.

TABLE 3.3 Language Identification in Ukraine (In Thousands and Percent).

	1959		1970		1979		
	Actual	Percent of Population	Actual	Percent of Population	Actual	Percent of Population	Percent Change (1970 - 1979)
As Native Language:							
Ukrainian	30,562	73.0	32,702	69.4	32,900	66.3	
Russian	10,172	24.3	13,254	28.1	15,500	31.2	
As Second Language:							
Ukrainian	-*	-	4,431	9.4	5,800	11.7	24.5
Russian	-	-	13,487	28.6	19,900	40.1	40.2

*Data on knowledge of a second language were not collected for the 1959 census.

Source: Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the 1979 Soviet Census," Radio Liberty Research 100.80, March 11, 1980, p. 7.

registering a change of 24.5 percent. However, Russian as a second language registered a more dramatic increase. In 1970, 28.6 percent of the population listed Russian as their second language while in 1979 it was 40.1 percent. Clearly there is a much stronger draw toward acquiring a knowledge of Russian rather than Ukrainian as a second language. Mother tongue identification according to region (see Table 3.4) also shows that in two decades some areas, particularly the highly industrialized regions of Donbas and the South, have experienced a dramatic decline in Ukrainian language affiliation.[234] Yet Western Ukraine has experienced almost no assimilation, even though that area has also undergone a noticeable degree of urbanization.[235]

These changes, or rather anomalies, can probably be attributed to a variety of factors. First, as discussed in Chapter Two, the national composition of Ukraine has altered noticeably over the past twenty years, in that the numerical strength of Russians is increasing at a faster rate than Ukrainians. Between 1970 and 1979 the Russian population, in absolute numbers, increased by more than 1,3 million, whereas the Ukrainian population grew by only 1.2 million (Table 2.6). This could account for the greater and continuous increase in mother tongue Russian speakers. However, if Ukrainians were not under pressure to learn the Russian language in order to function within their own republic, one would have found stronger native language identification. Moreover, there would be more Ukrainian speakers if non-Ukrainians were learning Ukrainian upon immigrating to the republic. It is a well accepted fact that first and second generation immigrants make it a point to learn the language of their new country. But as pointed out earlier this is not the case in Ukraine. Secondly, data on language affiliation from the 1970 census according to age category, showed that the overwhelming majority of children under the age of ten were unilingual Ukrainian speakers. It was under pressure from the educational and work environments that they acquired Russian.[236]

While the census data show that Russification of the population is definitely increasing, under the impact of the stringent language policies and the need to become proficient in Russian, the Ukrainian language is, nonetheless showing signs of revival --

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[234]Krawchenko, "Ethno-Demographic Trends in Ukraine," in *Ukraine after Shelest*, p. 113.

[235]See Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31 (January 1979):76-98.

[236]See Krawchenko, "Ethno-Demographic Trends in Ukraine," pp. 110-11.

TABLE 3.4 National Composition of Ukraine, 1959 - 79 (In thousands and percent).

	1959		1970		1979		Percent Change	
	Total Population	Percent of Total Population	Total Population	Percent of Total Population	Total Population	Percent of Total Population	1959-70	1970-79
Total	41,869	100.0	47,127	100.0	49,609*	100.0	12.6	5.3
Of whom:								
Ukrainians	32,158	76.8	35,284	74.9	36,489	73.6	9.7	3.4
Russians	7,091	16.9	9,126	19.4	10,472	21.1	28.7	14.7
Jews	840	2.0	777	1.6	634	1.3	-7.5	-18.4
Byelorussians	291	0.7	386	0.8	406	0.8	32.6	5.2
Moldavians	242	0.6	266	0.6	294	0.6	9.9	10.5
Poles	363	0.9	259	0.6	258	0.5	-18.7	-12.5
Bulgarians	219	0.5	234	0.5	234	0.5	6.8	1.7
Others	664	1.6	758	1.6	818	1.6	14.2	7.9

*This figure excludes the approximately 146,00 persons, including foreigners, residing temporarily in Ukraine.

Source: Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the 1979 Soviet Census," the Ukrainian Quarterly 36 (Number 3, 1980):272.

especially in Kiev. Statistical data on that city indicates that not only have the number of residents claiming to be of Ukrainian nationality increased, but so have the number of Ukrainian speakers (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6). This apparent Ukrainianization of Kiev over the past twenty years is one example of how both Ukrainian national consciousness and the Ukrainian language can reassert themselves.[237]

Ukrainian Intelligentsia and Dissidents

The acceptance or rejection of Russian as a common language for Soviet Ukrainians is manifest in a number of ways. It has already been outlined in the foregoing sections that in public life fluency in Russian is essential for a better education, more variety and quality in reading materials, travel, and the like. However, even though bilingualism has increasingly become a fact of life for many citizens of Ukraine, certain members of society have come to resent the trend and have actively begun to oppose the proliferation of Russian.

There are at least two basic groups of Ukrainians who advocate increased Ukrainian language usage and maintenance of language purity. On the one hand, there are Ukrainian national dissedents many of whom have been exiled or imprisoned because of their convictions. Their concerns and demands were far-reaching and went beyond the issue of language rights. It is interesting to note that the majority of dissidents had some higher education, many were professionals and some, at one stage or another, had gained party membership. The second group consisted of prominent Ukrainian state and Party leaders. Both groups were linked by their commitment to the preservation and development of the Ukrainian language.

Dissidents such as Mykyta Shumylo, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Ivan Dzyuba, and Sviatoslav Karavanskyi were prominent in their defense of Ukraine's language rights. Shumylo was one of the earliest defenders of the Ukrainian language; he wrote, in 1959:

> The Russian language should not oust the Ukrainian or the language of any other people...Love your language, cultivate it and guard it. It is your precious heritage, the heritage of centuries and generations.[238]

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[237]Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the 1979 Soviet Census," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 36 (Number 3, 1980):273.

[238]Cited by Farmer, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalities Policy," p. 216.

TABLE 3.5 Changes in the Population of Kiev, 1970 - 79.

	1970	1979	Percent Change
Ukrainians	1,056,905	1,456,000	37.8
Russians	373,569	474,000	26.9
Others	201,434	213,000	6.2
TOTAL	1,631,908	2,143,900	31.4

Source: Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the 1979 Soviet Census," The Ukrainian Quarterly 36 (Number 3, 1980):281.

TABLE 3.6 Language Identification in Kiev, 1959, 1970, 1979 (In thousands and percent).

	1959		1970		1979	
	Total	Percent of Population	Total	Percent of Population	Total	Percent of Population
As Native Language:						
Ukrainian	482.6	43.7	827.4	50.7	1,132.1	52.8
Russian	593.8	53.8	775.2	47.5	961.3	44.8
As Second Language:						
Ukrainian	-*	-	400.7	24.5	503.9	23.5
Russian	-	-	632.3	38.7	911.3	42.5

*Data on knowledge of a second language were not collected for the 1959 census.

Source: Ibid.

Antonenko-Davydovych, purged by Stalin in 1934 and rehabilitated in 1956, wrote a number of articles in leading Soviet journals demanding greater rights for the Ukrainian language.[239] In one article he argued that the letter " " should be reintroduced into Soviet Ukrainian orthography since its deletion in the 1930s was part of an attempt to Russify the Ukrainian alphabet. Reinstating the letter would contribute towards a greater differentiation between Ukrainian and Russian.[240] While this idea was mildly ridiculed by some official critics, [241] it received support from underground *samvydav* (self-publication) writers. [242]

Another early and important dissenter was Ivan Dzyuba, whose 1965 treatise entitled *Internationalism or Russification?* denounced Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine. He called for the maximum development of all national languages, cultures and traditions of the Soviet Union and asserted that no nation, language or culture be allowed to supersede another.[243] Above all Dzyuba argued that the great Russian chauvinism continued to exist under the Soviet regime as it had under the tsarist state apparatus and that all spheres of Ukrainian life were being Russified.

From the early 1960s, the dissident, Sviatoslav Karavanskyi actively supported language rights, not only for Ukrainians but also for other minorities in the USSR. His concerns were expressed in numerous open letters, complaints and petitions of protest to high government officials. In one petition, addressed to the prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR, basing himself on Leninist principles which called for the provision of equal education opportunities, he demanded the indictment of Iurii Dadenkov, Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, for his negligence and failure to implement the teaching of the Ukrainian language in secondary and post-secondary schools. Consequently, Dadenkov's negligence was, according to Karavanskyi, a violation of Articles 66 and 167 of the Criminal code of the Ukrainian SSR. Also, Karavanskyi accused Dadenkov of violating Article 66, which guarantees national and racial equality, because

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[239]See his articles in *Zmina*, March, 1964; *Dnipro*, No. 9 (1960), pp. 142-52; *Literaturna Ukraina*, January 19, 1965, and March 5, 1965; "Iak my hovorymo" (Kiev: Radians'kyi pysmennyk, 1970).
[240]Farmer, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalities Policy," pp. 216-217.
[241]V. Rusanivskyi, "Za chym tuzhyty?" *Literaturna Ukraina*, November 28, 1969, p.2.
[242]See *Ukrainskyi visnyk* 3 (Smoloskyp, 1971), pp. 92-95 for details of the discussions.
[243]Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* pp. 212-13.

Ukrainian was relegated to a subordinate position in the educational system. Failure to implement these articles,claimed Karavanskyi, were indictable and punishable offences.[244]

The most important Party and state officials to defend the Ukrainian language were Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the CPU from 1963 to 1972, and Iurii Dadenkov, who emerged as a champion of Ukrainian language rights notwithstanding Karavanskyi's condemnation of him.

During Shelest's tenure, a number of policies designed to promote the Ukrainian language, culture and history were initiated. When Shelest was appointed to office he was faced with the problem of counterbalancing two opposing forces. On the one hand his position in the Party meant that he was required to carry out the policy of *sliianie* or merging of nations. On the other hand, he was faced with the demands being made by the Ukrainian intelligentsia to assure language and cultural rights. An example of pressure coming from this quarter was the conference devoted to the question of the status of the Ukrainian language held in Kiev from 10-15 February 1963 (shortly before Shelest took office), and attended by over 1000 members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The conference passed a resolution to be presented to the Central Committee of the CPU, requesting that Ukrainian be made the official language of instruction in institutions of higher and specialized education, in state and public institutions and in all places of work.[245]

One of the first measures undertaken by Shelest, was the revival of Ukrainian historical studies through the reactivation of certain important education institutions. In this connection both the Institute of Archeology and the Institute of History were placed within the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.[246] In time, a number of new publications, journals and a historical encyclopedia were established.[247]

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[244]For details of Karavanskyi's petition see Viacheslav Chornovil, compiler, *The Chornovil Papers*, with an Introduction by Frederick C. Barghoorn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 170-174; also "About one Political Error," ibid., pp. 174-80.

[245]*Nasha kultura* 3 (1963), cited by Jaroslaw Pelenski, "Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine (1963-1972): A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism," in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, p. 286.

[246]Ibid., p. 288.

[247]For example, F. P. Shevchenko, ed., *Seredni viky na Ukraini*, Vyp.I (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1971); *Kyivska starovyna*; the *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* came under a new editorial board and began publishing articles with a definite pro-Ukrainian orientation; a 26 volume encyclopedia written in Ukrainian was published, *Istoria mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR v dvadtsiaty shesty tomakh*, ed. I. Tronko (Kyiv: Holovna redaktsiia ukrainskoi radianskoe entsyklopedii, 1967-1974), ibid.

Shelest's attitudes towards the Ukrainian national fact are revealed in his book *Ukraino nasha radianska*. In it he glorifies Ukraine's cossack past, emphasizes the nation's achievements in socio-economic, political and cultural development without acknowleging Russia's role, as is customary in Soviet publications. Most importantly, Shelest treated Ukraine as an entity unto itself, apart from either tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union. His work was written only in Ukrainian.

Iurii Dadenkov, who was the Ukrainian Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education from 1960 to 1973, contributed towards a defence of Ukrainian language rights firstly by exposing the real place of the language in higher education in Ukraine, and then by proposing measures to rectify the situation. In 1965 he reported that only 55 percent of those students enrolled in Ukraine's 50 institutions of higher education were Ukrainians by nationality, as well less than 50 percent of the instructors. In Ukraine's eight universities, 61 percent of the students and 56 percent of the teaching staff were Ukrainian. Yet in each university less than half the lectures were delivered in Ukrainian. In the case of Odessa University only ten percent of the lectures were delivered in Ukrainian.[248] In light of these facts, Dadenkov proposed an intensive and systematic Ukrainianizaton of higher education which would shift the language of instruction to Ukrainian, require all professors to learn Ukrainian, ensure that universities publish texts primarily in Ukrainian, and that administrative business in universities be carried out in Ukrainian. Moscow vetoed all of Dadenkov's proposals.[249]

The relatively liberal Shelest period in Ukraine ended abruptly when he was removed from office in 1972 and exiled to Moscow. His hasty departure from office was followed by the massive arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals and a large-scale purge of the Party apparatus. The central government was determined to check the movement for cultural rights in Ukraine.

The common denominator of the two streams of Ukrainians supporting and defending the Ukrainian language, (the dissident intellectuals and the political elite) was their struggle to elevate Ukrainian to the status of the primary language in the republic. This clashed with Moscow's policy designed to entrench Russian in every aspect of life in Soviet Ukraine. The language question in Ukraine became politically charged, as the

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[248]Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post Stalin Era*, pp. 140-41.
[249]Ibid., p. 42.

internal colonialism model predicted.

Hechter writes that in the internal colony a cultural division of labour facilitates identitiy maintenance. In our examination of the social structure we have shown that a cultural division of labour existed in Ukraine. This division is also evident in the language sphere. In Ukraine, the language of upward mobility and high educational achievement has clearly become Russian. Yet linguistic assimilation and cultural convergence between the core and periphery has not occurred despite the powerful incentives offered by the central government. In the city of Kiev one has actually seen an increase in the number of Ukrainian language speakers. In 1979, 90 percent of Ukrainians in the republic still maintained Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Calculations by Bohdan Krawchenko have shown that only 5 percent of Ukraine's population could be considered Russified in 1979, little change from the 1970 figure of 4 percent.[250] Finally, both dissidents and members of Ukraine's political elite have tried to defend Ukrainian language rights.

B. Religion

Soviet communism inherently disallows any form of pluralistic thought, and as such does not promote religious participation amongst its citizens unless it serves some specific purpose and conforms to strict guidelines as determined by the central government. Soviet authorities regularly conduct antireligious campaigns which attach negative values to any religious beliefs that the populace may have.[251] Secularism and atheism are matters of state policy. Admitting to religious affiliation results in blocked access to Party membership, creates impediments in obtaining a higher education, and results in a general curtailment of upward social mobility.[252] Even though religious practise is not an unacceptable way of life in Soviet society, religion does serve as a cultural marker identifying Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

Throughout Ukrainian history religion and national consciousness, especially in Western Ukraine, have been closely intertwined. The liquidation of Ukraine's two national

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[250]Krawchenko, "Ethno-Demographic Trends in Ukraine," p. 111.
[251]Russel P. Moroziuk "Antireligious Activity in Ukraine." *the Ukrainian Quarterly* 36 (Number 1, 1980):48-49.
[252]See Howard L. Biddulph "Religious Participation of Youth in the USSR," *Soviet Studies* 31 (July 1979):48-64.

churches -- the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic -- but not the Russian Orthodox Church, indicates that religion plays an important role in showing how the central government manipulates cultural symbols and institutions to enhance its own legitimacy.

Instrumental to the evolution of the close relationship between church and national consciousness was the Byzantine heritage of cooperation between spiritual and secular powers, the absence of a single, international ecclesiastical authority in Eastern Christendom, lay participation in church government and the use of an intelligible liturgical language.[253] The Eastern Church, unlike the Church of Rome, was able to become a national institution in that it was autocephalous in organization; its boundaries, by and large, coincided with state borders, it generally identified itself with the ruling nationality in multiethnic states and, conversely, when an Orthodox people gained political freedom, steps were taken towards the establishment of an independent church hierarchy.[254] Thus, shortly following the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, which established Moscow's hegemony over the Ukrainian Cossack state, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, in 1687. But when the Ukrainian state again emerged briefly after the 1917 Revolution, a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church began to develop, and in 1920 seceded from the Russian church. In the 1930s it was destroyed by the Soviet regime. A revival, experienced during the World War II German occupation, promoted an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism that opposed the Russian Orthodox Church.[255]

The other national church is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic or Uniate Church. While it adheres to the Eastern Byzantine rite, it is nonetheless part of the Roman Catholic Church, maintaining a semi-autonomous existence in that it has a married clergy, uses the Church Slavonic language and is largely confined to Western Ukraine. Under Hapsburg rule, the church came under western influences and through a clergy educated in the Ukrainian national spirit it became the most important national institution of Western Ukraine.[256]

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[253]Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Religion and Nationalism in the Contemporary Ukraine," p. 81.
[254]Ibid.
[255]Ibid.
[256]Vasyl Markus, "Religion in the Soviet Ukraine: A Political Problem of Modernizing," in *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR*, ed. Ihor Kamenetsky (Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1977), p. 156.

Because the combination of religion and nationalism could be a strong and disruptive force against Russian presence in Ukraine, following World War II, the Soviet government took action to liquidate both Ukrainian churches. They were proclaimed as "anti-people and alien bodies" in the life of the Ukrainian nation and history.[257] Their members and clergy were persecuted, many were exiled to Siberia, while others carried on their activities underground. This annihilation meant that only the Russian Orthodox Church, which had become reconciled with the Kremlin in 1943, remained more or less intact as a legitimate religious body within both Western and Eastern Ukraine. For the Soviet leadership, the Russian Orthodox Church was seen as the logical replacement for the two dissolved Ukrainian churches. The liquidation of the Ukrainian churches was their punishment for their strong Ukrainian nationalism while the Russian Orthodox Church was rewarded by being allowed to operate without fear of persecution. This did not mean, however, that atheism and antireligious propaganda ceased to be major policies.[258] But it did allow the leaders of the Russian church to start the process of converting Ukrainians to the Russian Orthodox faith. Consequently, the Russian Orthodox Church has become an excellent vehicle in the continuing campaign of Russification. Where the Party and antireligious agencies have failed in weakening the national character of the Ukrainian Churches, the Russian Orthodox church is allowed to do the work.

One other important feature that gives the Russian Orthodox church prominence over other denominations in Ukraine is that its believers are rarely imprisoned. Those few that have been imprisoned for their open support of the church were punished either because of their overt anti-communist Russian nationalism or because of membership in a group advocating human rights, and not simply because of affiliation with the church.[259] In view of this, it would seem that a door has been left open for the devout citizen that wishes to practise some form of religious belief without fearing reprisals. This lenient attitude of the authorities towards the Russian church has not, however, stopped Ukrainians from attempting to gain official recognition for their own church. In 1982 a group formed to promote the legalization of the Uniate Church, but their demands were rejected and the leaders imprisoned.[260]

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[257]Ibid.
[258]See Moroziuk, "Antireligious Activity in Ukraine," pp. 48-64.
[259]Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," p. 11.
[260]Ibid., p. 12.

The Russian Orthodox Church has become a cultural institution within Ukraine that can be identified with the state, notwithstanding official Soviet denunciation of religion. This church serves a number of important needs for the central government: it has become a contributing factor in the Russification of Ukrainians, it hastens the process of assimilation, and it enhances the development of a homogenous Soviet national culture. The Ukrainan churches, on the other hand, are seen as an element of nationalist oppostion to state authority and for some Ukrainians have become a centre for political dissent.

C. Conclusion

Language and religion are important cultural markers in an internal colony. In the case of Ukraine both have become politically significant. Typically, an internal colony experiences the political intervention of the central government into matters of education, language and religion. During tsarist times the Ukrainian language was harshly discriminated against when the Ems Ukaz forbade the use of Ukrainian in publishing and education. Today, Ukraine's language policy and educational system is totally determined by central authorites. These policies are designed to relegate the Ukrainian language to a secondary place in the republic's schools, media, and public life. Ukrainians have to learn the language of the core in order to achieve mobility within their own republic and they are also relegated to the lower rungs of the socio-occupational structure.

However, despite intensive pressures, the population of Ukraine retains a large measure of cultural distinctiveness. What is particularly significant in this respect is that Ukrainians who were the most vocal in demanding cultural rights represented the most socially mobilized sectors of the population. It seems to us that the theory which best explains this seeming anomoly is that of internal colonialism. Because modernization was uneven and did not result in equalization, what emerged was a structured pattern of inequality. This relationship of inequality in turn generated a reactive national movement seeking to redress this imbalance. This same inequality produced a cultural division of labour based on religion and language, important cultural markers identifying Ukrainians.

IV. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF AN INTERNAL COLONY

The political dimension of an internal colony is the last aspect that remains to be discussed. Hechter writes that in the course of national development, political integration between regions occurs when the regional elites demonstrate the ability to jointly determine their political behavior. [261] To illustrate the point he gives the following analogy:

> If two groups sharing a common occupation (e.g. coal miners), but differing in objective cultural forms (e.g. of different religion), may be shown to have similar general political preferences, this indicates a high level of national political integration. Hence, political integration of this kind implies that objective cultural factors, such as language or religion, cease to have salience in the formation of a collectivity's political demands. [262]

In certain cases, however, the actual political incorporation of regions does not necessarily end an essentially colonial relationship that may have existed between a more dominant region and its surrounding territories. In Hechter's case study this occurred in 16th century England between the crown and Celtic territories.[263] In such an event many salient features of a colonial situation persist within the boundaries of the developing metropolitan state. Thus, states Hechter, internal colonialism arose out of the same systemic needs as the overseas colonies, which became suppliers of raw materials and food.[264] The political malintegration of core and periphery is evident when the periphery's demands tend to focus on needs specific to its citizens and when these needs are easily separable from the demands and needs of core members.

Political incorporation has a number of decisive consequences for an internal colony. Some of these are political centralization, loss of sovereignty and political dependency upon the centre. Policies which are concerned with the administration of the periphery are decided in a larger political arena where members of the periphery play a minor role. [265] The centre formulates policies that control the activities of the regional police, government, political offices and industry. To insure that the system is maintained, those members of the peripheral elite, who have voluntarily assimilated, are mobilized and

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[261]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, see Chapter 4, "The Consequences of Political Incorporation," pp. 79-123.
[262]Ibid., p. 19.
[263]Ibid., p. 80.
[264]Ibid.
[265]Ibid., p. 119.

are supported by a strong military, a closely scruitinized hierarchical system and a common education system. Once a regional population, suffering from economic inequality and perceiving itself to be in a disadvantaged position *vis-a-vis* the centre, begins to crystallize its political opposition around the differentiating issues and inequality, the political stability of the core becomes threatened. [266] Finally, the periphery's demands become formulated around ethnic terms rather than on the basis of social class and ultimately culminate in a movement towards political and economic autonomy and secession.

In terms of this case study, we have to show that Ukraine is a totally penetrated state, that political integration between core and periphery has not been accomplished and, most importantly, that there is evidence of reactive nationalism. In terms of the latter, the existence and nature of political dissent in Ukraine has to be reviewed and contrasted with the movement of dissent that exists in the RSFSR. But first we will address ourselves to the questions of Ukraine's status as a republic of the USSR, Soviet nationalities policy, and the federal administrative structure.

A. Soviet Federalism and Ukraine

In structuring the new socialist society, Lenin recognized the need to build a framework which would both control and use the borderland minorities towards that end. The ultimate goal was to create a monolithic state. While he intially rejected the idea of federalism, he realized that in the transitional period it was the only solution to the problem of the Bolsheviks' lack of support in the former Russian Empire's peripheral nationalities.[267] What eventually evolved was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a complex "federal multi-national state."[268] In the case of Ukraine, its political incorporation into the USSR was officially decreed with the creation of the USSR in 1923, until then it was a nominally independent state. In reality, Ukraine came under Soviet rule through

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[266]Ibid., p. 34.
[267]See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp.35-50.
[268]Constitution of the USSR 1977, Article 70. An English translation of the Constitution of the USSR and Rules of the CPSU can be found in John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, 5th ed. rev. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 247-307. Article 70 is found on p. 262.

invasion by the Red Army, which began in December 1919 and ended by early February 1920.[269]

Every constitution of the USSR has upheld the principle of federalism and has guaranteed each constituent republic equal rights and opportunities, including the right to freely secede from the union,[270] a separate constitution,[271] the right to develop their own economies and cultures,[272] and the right to enter into relations with other states.[273] In other words, the sovereignty and separate identitiy of the minority nationalities with republican status is recognized. The entire system is to be guided by the organizational principle of 'democratic centralism' which means a combination of:

> ...central leadership [the CPSU] with local initiative and creative activity [yet demanding] strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority and that decisions of higher bodies be obligatory for lower bodies...[274]

These are principles that have lead to the structuring of a well controlled hierarchical system.[275] In a state such as the Soviet Union, where there are more than one hundred nationalities, and where ethnic Russians constitute almost half the population, this meant that the leadership of the numerically dominant nationality could set and implement goals and policies for all the national minorities without consultation, or input from their local governments. The reality of the USSR is that virtually all power has been monopolized by the Russians in state administrations, the CPSU, the economy and other sectors of Soviet life, all of which have had serious repercussions on Ukraine's sovereignty and status within the USSR. The offical stand towards the nationalities following Stalin's death has tended to remain unchanged from one Soviet administration to another. After Khrushchev's Secret Speech in 1956, some of the more repressive policies of Stalin were lifted. This relative 'freedom' gave impetus to the revival of Ukrainian national arts and literature. But, Khrushchev did little to actually alter policies and attitudes towards the

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[269]Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Takeover of the Ukraine," in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, p. 123.
[270]Constitution of the USSR [1977], Article 72; see Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, p. 263.
[271]Ibid., Article 76, p. 264.
[272]Ibid., Article 77, p. 265.
[273]Ibid., Article 80.
[274]Ibid., Article 3, p. 249, this statement is also found in the Rules of the CPSU, Article 19, ibid., p. 295.
[275]For a discussion of the "contradictory logic" of the USSR Constituion see Andrew Sorokowski, "The Dialictics of Convergence: Federalism and Nationality Policy in the USSR Constitution," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 36 (Number 3, 1980):236-52.

nationalities. In fact, the 1961 program of the CPSU suggested that nations as such would cease to exist and that assimilation was the ultimate goal. The Programme stated that:

> Full scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved.[276]

To aid this process, the use of Russian as the common language for the homogenizing of national groups was promoted. The programme also placed some value on national development as evidenced by the following statement:

> ...under socialism the nations and their sovereignty grows stronger...[the Party will] continue the all-round economic and cultural development of all the Soviet nations and nationalities, ensuring their increasingly close fraternal cooperation, mutual aid, unity and affinity in all spheres of life... The liquidation of manifestations of nationalism is in the interests of all nations and nationalities of the USSR.[277]

This suggested that the national minorities would eventually merge with the Great Russian majority. Thus, on the one hand, the Party realized that national identity was still a force, but on the other hand, it continued to advocate the merging and drawing together of the ethnic groups. This assimilationist drive was resisted by the nationalities and, under Khrushchev, an open opposition emerged in Ukraine. Under the collective leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin, which began in 1964, repressive measures to control opposition were once again implemented. The Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in 1971 also returned to a strong emphasis on integration, strict centralism and Russification.[278] The new constitution in 1977 reflected this perspective.

The far reaching effects of centralization under Brezhnev and Kosygin continued the tsarist legacy of placing virtually all major decision-making power in the hands of the central government in Moscow. Local governments were simply to administer the plans as sent them by the central agencies. Looking at the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and the government in Kiev, one finds that administrators are all centrally appointed on the basis of the *nomenklatura*, a complex procedure of selecting Party personnel. The top positions of each republic are the first and second secretaries of the Party and their appointments are made directly by Moscow.[279] Following World War II, the national

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[276]Robert Conquest, p. 148.
[277]Ibid., p. 149.
[278]Mykola Stepanenko, "Ukrainian Culture in the Brezhnev-Kosygin Era: Some Observations," in *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, pp. 75-76.
[279]For a description of their particular jobs and functions see John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second

composition of the CPU was 61 per cent Ukrainians, 36 per cent Russians, and 3.5 per cent other nationalities, however, control was not in the hands of Ukrainians. Both the first and second Secretaries were Russians, also, out of 13 Politburo members, only 6 were Ukrainians. For the first time in the history of the CPU, in 1953 a Ukrainian was appointed First Secretary of the Ukrainian republic. In 1958, Ukrainians still only represented 60 per cent of the CPU, 3 per cent less than in 1940. While under Shelest, Ukrainians did enjoy a larger share of top leadership in the CPU, however, their representation was still less than their share of the total population. (In 1968, 65 per cent of the CPU was Ukrainian, whereas, in the 1970 census, they comprised 75 per cent of the total population of Ukraine.)[280] Also, it is very important to note that in the USSR, indigenous members holding high office in their own republic do not necessarily have power and authority. Their positions must always be compared to Russian-named personnel holding offices which, may or may not be as prestigious in title, but, certainly presitigious in authority.[281] Indeed, during Brezhnev's term in office it became the practise that the first secretary of the republic was almost always of the titular nationality, while the second secretary was an ethnic Russian. Important here is the great power of the second secretary, since the second secretary has charge over a republic's *nomenklatura* and, therefore, can veto any personnel appointments put forth by the first secretary. This, in essence, prevents the first secretary from creating factions which could produce opposition blocks within the Party. The second secretary can also dismiss the first secretary but not vice versa, which again points to the superior position of the ethnic Russians.[282]

Central authorities intervene in Ukrainian domestic affairs in numerous other spheres, for example, in the judicial system and the appointment of republic KGB personnel who, like the second secretaries, are appointed by Moscow without previous consultation with republic administrators. The Supreme Court of the USSR is an instrument of centralization because it interprets federal statutes and fundamental principles, and determines the legal codes of the republics.[283]

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[279](cont'd) Secretaries in non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies* 29 (January 1977):3-36.
[280]See Krawchenko, "Social Mobilization and National Consciousness, pp. 508-17.
[281]d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire*, p. 127.
[282]Ibid., pp. 7-8.
[283]John N. Hazard, "The Status of the Ukrainian Republic Under the Soviet

Control over the entire system of government and all that it entails is with the CPSU. Its power is supreme and it is not bound by constitutional law. In fact, it alone can change the constitution at will. Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution describes the CPSU as "the leading and directing force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system, of all state and public organizations." Entrance into the party is tightly controlled. In 1981, Brezhnev announced that there were just under seventeen and a half million Party members, representing only 6.5 percent of the entire USSR population, of these a large majority were ethnic Russians.[284] The CPSU maintains its power on the domestic front through the army, whose officers are mostly Party members and the KGB (the committee for State Security or the Soviet security police), whose members stand beyond the rule of law.[285]

B. Political Dissent

Evidence of the existence of reactive nationalism is crucial if the internal colonial model is to apply to Ukraine. Reactive nationalism exists when certain culturally distinct, indigenous members of the periphery openly demand autonomy and separation from the core despite the wishes of the central government. Dissent, for the purposes of this paper, is defined as opposition to government or its specific policies. In Ukraine dissent is neither a recent nor a new phenomenon. Nationalist movements have surfaced at various times throughout its history since Russian conquest in the 17th century and have stemmed from a variety of factors. A thorough discussion of all phases and stages of nationalist movements in both the eastern and western provinces of Ukraine is beyond the scope of this paper, however, we will mention three distinct examples of reactive nationalism during Ukraine's recent history. These are: the national revival which took shape in the mid-nineteenth century; the development of strong national sentiments following the 1917 Russian revolution, and the most recent movement of dissent which evolved following the death of Stalin.

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[283](cont'd) Federation," in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, p. 226.
[284] Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), p.111.
[285]Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, pp. 180-83.

In the pre-Soviet era, modern Ukrainian nationalism started in the eastern provinces early in the nineteenth century. At this time the proponents of the Ukrainian revival were mostly the left-bank nobility, descendants of the former Cossack officers, who upheld Ukraine's cultural distinctivess.[216] This cultural movement took on serious political dimensions with the formation of the clandestine Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood in 1846, a group which envisioned an independent Ukraine, albeit as a republic of a pan-Slavic federation. Their programme called for the abolition of serfdom and the elimination of class distinctions.[217] Having learnt of the existence of the Brotherhood, the tsarist regime either imprisoned or exiled beyond the borders of Ukraine most members of the organization. In the 19th century, anti-Russian sentiments were not localized to Ukraine (the Polish uprising in 1863 was also against the tsarist regime), however, none of the other nationalities were dealt with as severely as the Ukrainians. In the case of Ukraine, tsarist policy supressed even the very concept of a separate Ukrainian nationality. Thus, Ukrainians were considered "Little Russians", their language simply a bastardized dialect of Russian. The 1876 Ems Ukaz banned all publications in the Ukrainian language. Again, such a draconian measure was never directed towards any other ethnic group within the Russian Empire.[218]

It was really during the revolution in 1917 that the Ukrainian national movement manifested itself most broadly. In the course of that revolution Ukrainians established their own national government, the Central Rada, a Ukrainian language press and Ukrainian language schools, a national army and a national church. Ukrainian cultural and intellectual life flourished. When Ukrainians gave Ukrainian political parties an impressive victory in the Russian Constituent Assembly elections -- two months after the October revolution -- there could be no doubt that the national movement had secured a popular base. Ukrainian parties, which demanded sovereignty, received two-thirds of the total number of votes cast.[219] During the revolution, Ukrainian parties saw self-determination as a necessary step in solving Ukraine's domestic problems. The non-Ukrainian parties -- Russian, Polish, Jewish -- either completely rejected the idea of a separate Ukrainian state or, they could

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[216]Ivan Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War," *East European Quarterly* 11 (Number 2, 1976):142.
[217]Ibid.
[218]Ibid., p. 144.
[219]O. H. Radkey, *The Elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 78-9.

come to terms with autonomy for Ukrainians, but only within a federated state, a point of view supported by several Polish and Jewish parties.[290]

Bolsheviks came to power in Ukraine with little indigenous support. Their regime was resisted by broad layers of the population. Recognizing the need to reach a *modus vivendi* with Ukrainians, Lenin, in 1919 made three policy changes. He promised cultural autonomy, which became known as *korenizatsia*; he criticized the earlier notion of detaching the industrial Donets-Kryvyi Rih basin from Ukraine; and he granted Ukraine full Soviet republican status which included the constitutional right of secession.[291]

Within the Communist Party of Ukraine, nominally independent of the Communist Party of Russia at this time, under pressure from the national movement, there emerged autonomist currents. This point of view was strongly expressed in a memorandum sent to the third Communist International in 1920, which stressed that Ukraine was a separate nation, and should have its own economic, political and party centres. Prominent Ukrainian communists as Mykola Skrypnyk, Oleksander Shumskyi and Mykola Khvylovi personified the demands for greater independence. Skrypnyk openly opposed the Russifying policies of the Russian Communist Party, and demanded that the Party implement the principles of Lenin's nationalities policies which, among other things, guaranteed the rights of secession. [292] In 1926 Khvylovyi went so far as to regard Ukraine as an independent republic. He wrote:

> The Ukrainian economy is not Russian and cannot be so, if only because the Ukrainian culture, which emanates from the economic structure [of the country] and in turn influences it, bears characteristic forms and features, so does our economy. In a word -- the [Soviet] Union remains a Union and the Ukraine is an independent state.[293]

The relatively tolerant nationalities policy introduced by Lenin in 1919 was abandoned once Stalin established himself as the singular ruler of the Communist Party and of the Soviet Union. The effort to collectivize and subjugate the Ukrainian peasants, resulted in the man-made famine of 1932-33. To rid Ukraine of "bourgeois nationalism," a massive purge of the Party's leadership and of Ukrainian cultural and academic circles was

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[290]For a detailed account of political parties in Ukraine at this point in history, see Chapter III "Political Parties in Ukraine" in Borys, ibid., pp. 73-97.
[291]Bilinsky, "The Communist Take-Over of the Ukraine," p. 127.
[292]Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine*, p. 335.
[293]M. Khvylovyi, "Apolohety pysarysmu" (The Apologists of Scribbling), *Kultura i pobut* (Culture and Life), *(Visti)* No. 13, 1926, pp.1-8, cited by Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929-39)* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 41.

carried out[294], thus, effectively annihilating Ukraine's intellectual and leadership classes. The harsh and repressive treatment of Ukraine under Stalin's rule continued until his death, stifling any manifestations of reactive nationalism. However, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies gave the renewed impetus to this movement. By providing some official safeguards against administrative arbitrariness and police terror experienced under Stalin's dictatorship, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies stimulated political dissent. A "public opinion" was born. Having heard of Stalin's crimes, the younger generation began questioning claims of the Party's wisdom, infallibility and moral integrity. Khrushchev himself contributed to this critical mood by failing to completely eliminate the 'cult of personality.' The successive thaws and freezes instigated by him dashed hopes raised by the promise of de-Stalinization, increasing the sense of alienation among the young, who began to look for alternatives to official policies and party ideology.[295]

By the mid-1960's public criticism of the existing order made its appearance in underground literature called *samvydav* or self-publication. Later, the Ukrainian movement of opposition developed its own organ, *Ukrainian Herald*. In addition, numerous petitions were sent to central authorities, signed by people from a cross section of society including intellectuals, professionals and workers.[296] Finally, there were demonstrations, strikes and public gatherings protesting, for example, the destruction by the KGB of the Kiev university stained glass panels depicting an angry Shevchenko. In September 1972, thousands of workers went on strike in Dnipropetrovsk, a heavily industrialized region, demanding higher wages and a general improvement in the standard of living.[297]

From *samvydav* journals we learn that this nascent movement of dissent was spontaneous, and engulfed all the regions of Ukraine.[298] It raised various issues -- national and civil rights, minority rights for smaller ethnic groups such as the Crimean Tartars and religious freedom.[299]

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[294]Ibid., pp. 43-61.
[295]Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," p. 74.
[296]For an extensive list of the petitions and letters see Viacheslav Chornovil's compilation of documents and papers in *The Chornovil Papers;* and Michael Browne, ed. *Ferment in Ukraine.*
[297]See *The Ukrainian Review* volume 19 (Number 3, 1972):91 and volume 21 (Number 1, 1974): 26-27.
[298]See David Kowalewski, "Ukrainian Opposition in the Light of Demonstration," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 36 (Number 2, 1980):171-82.
[299]See Julian Birch, "The Nature and Sources of Dissidence in Ukraine," pp.

The basic difference between the Ukrainian dissidents and their Russian counterparts is that the latter concern themselves only with civil rights issues, while the former also raise the national question. Russian dissidents, being members of the core, while advocating freedom of expression other democratic rights have largely avoided raising national demands. Moreover, Russian dissidents as a rule are treated more leniently than Ukrainian oppositionists. This is especially the case with Russians who upheld Russian chauvinism and national issues. They are left relatively free to express their views or, if arrested, they receive lighter sentences and are treated more leniently than dissidents of other national groups, particularly Ukrainians.[300] Ukrainian dissidents are given longer and more severe sentences than Russian oppositionist and those Ukrainians in the labour camps cannot even serve their prison terms within their own republic, but are sent beyond the borders.

Among the most significant documents to emerge from the Ukrainian dissident movement was Ivan Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification?* This was a comprehensive analysis of Russia's policies towards Ukraine. Despite its strong statements, attacking current Soviet nationalities policies, it was circulated in Ukraine, most probably with the tacit approval of Petro Shelest. The Jurists' group was also significant and it attempted to campaign in favour of Ukraine's independence. This group of seven intellectuals, seeing Ukrainians discriminated against in their own republic, drew up a programme that embraced elements of national communism. Their document stated:

> We are struggling for an independent Ukraine such that, while providing to a high degree for the material and spiritual needs of her citizens on the basis of a socialized economy, she would develop towards communism, and secondly, (a Ukraine) in which all citizens would truly enjoy their political freedoms and determine the direction of the economic and political development of the Ukraine - such is the purpose of the ultimate struggle of our 'party'. [301]

Several organized clandestine groups surfaced in the 1960s as well. Among the most significant ones were the United Party for the Liberation of the Ukraine, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants Union, Ukrainian National Committee, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Democratic Union of Socialists, Ukrainian National Front, the Creative Youth

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[300]See Julian Birch, "The Nature and Sources of Dissidence in Ukraine," pp. 307-30; and Alexander J. Motyl, "Roy Medvedev: Dissident of Conformist?," *Survey* 25 (Summer 1980):74-85.
[301]Ivan Kandyba, "To the First Secretary of CC CPU, Petro Yukymovych Shelest," in *Ferment in the Ukraine*, p. 60.

of Dnipropetrovsk, and Union of Ukrainian Youth of Galicia.[302] Varying in size from ten to one hundred members, these groups were severely punished by the Russian authorities when their existence was discovered. Their existence, however, is a clear indication of the persistence of reactive nationalsim in Soviet Ukraine.

A demographic breakdown of dissidence shows that the strongest nationalist sentiments for separation are to be found in Western Ukraine. In the eastern industrial cities, having particularly large Russian communities, autonomist nationalism is the rule (i.e. autonomy within the framework of a genuine federation). Interestingly, however, in his analysis of the geographical distribution of arrest for nationalist activity, Kenneth Farmer has found that recently a shift has taken place.[303] During the Khrushchev period most organized groups espousing separation were based in Western Ukraine. However, in 1965-66, only two-thirds of this type of nationalist activity was located there, whereas by 1969-72 more than half the activity had shifted to Eastern Ukraine.[304] Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that under Shelest, some opposition could be expressed without fear of severe reprisals and, as a result, many groups spontaneously came into being throughout the country.

Although, due to the paucity of data, no study on Ukrainian dissidents has been able to provide extensive data on the social background of Ukrainian dissidents, available evidence suggests that the majority are well educated and are either members of the intelligentsia or white collar staff.[305]

Moscow authorities became alarmed at the growth of dissent in Ukraine and in 1972 a wave of repression was unleashed. *The Ukrainian Herald*, labelled this purge, which began in 1971, the "General Pogrom."[306] Hundreds of individuals were tried *in camera* and sentenced to serve long sentences in labour camps. Information emerging from the camps reveals that close to 45 percent of the political prisoners are Ukrainians. While the "General Pogrom" has yet to be fully assessed, it is thought that it was

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[302]For details of the groups' aims and activities see Farmer, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalities Policy," pp. 237-44.
[303]Ibid., pp. 263-67.
[304]See Birch, "The Nature and Sources of Dissidence in Ukraine," pp. 308-9.
[305]Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition after Stalin," in *Ukraine After Shelest*, p. 31; and, Bohdan Krawchenko and Jim A. Carter, "Dissidents in Ukraine before 1972: A Summary Statistical Profile," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 8 (Winter 1983):85-88.
[306]*The Ukrainian Herald* 7-8, pp. 125-61.

implemented to curtail the revival of cultural and public life that emerged in the 1960s.[307] The retaliation was a clear indication that the Soviet leadership would spare no effort in its attempts to contain Ukrainian national assertiveness.

C. Conclusion

At the political level an internal colony, according to the model, must exhibit a number of interrelated features: first, the core must intervene directly into the affairs of the periphery to such a degree that the periphery is rendered incapable of determining its own political fate; secondly, the colonial relationship that existed prior to political incorporation of the periphery has to continue after its absorbtion by the core; and thirdly, a distinctive regional politics must be evident, along with a reactive nationalism. All of these characteristics characterize contemporary Ukraine.

The centre intervenes into the political affairs of Ukraine at all levels. The central CPSU leadership has undisputed control over the entire Soviet Union and demands subordination from all sectors of society. Entry into the CPSU is controlled and the monopoly of party rule is maintained through the military and KGB

In Ukraine, top political positions are filled by Moscow. Early in the Soviet period Stalin removed most ethnic Ukrainians from top government positions and replaced them with Russians from Moscow. Today, even if Ukrainians occupy important positions in the government, their power is undermined by Russians such as the second secretary who holds the reins of power in the republic. Since 1971 this office has almost always tended to be filled by an ethnic Russian. Only the authorities in Moscow or an appointed KGB officer can overrule the second secretary. Thus, the first secretary, a Ukrainian since 1954, plays a lesser role.

Centralism, integration and Russification, characteristic of the Brezhnev and Kosygin era, has reinforced the tendency to shift all the major decision-making power to the central government in Moscow. In general, Ukraine's subordination to Moscow's rule is not unlike that which existed prior to 1917. While distinct regional politics were evident

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[307]Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition after Stalin," p. 31.

during tsarist rule, they became more pronounced following the millitary take-over of Ukraine by the Red Army. Autonomist currents emerged within the Party represented by communists such as Skrypnyk, Khvyloviy and Volobuiev who demanded economic, cultural and political rights for Ukrainians. More recently Shelest's defence of Ukraine's rights also points to the existence of regional politics, or what Hechter terms "peripheral sectionalism."

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to analyse Soviet Ukraine's position within the USSR as a case study of the process of national development in culturally heterogenous societies. There are basically two conflicting and opposite theories as to the future outcome of national development. First, there are the traditional Western theories of national development and official Soviet ideology both claiming that cultural distinctiveness ceases to have salience as core-periphery interaction is heightened through the effects of industrialization and modernization. These views are challenged by the second school, the internal colonialism theory developed by Michael Hechter in his analysis of Celtic nationalism. This theory suggests that even after industrialization ethnic identity in the periphery will persist, as long as a cultural division of labour has been institutionalized. Also, the internal colonial model seeks to explain why reactive ethnic solidarity and secessionist movements within peripheral regions of complex democratic industrialized societies continues to be a significant phenomenon. This case study is an attempt to apply the internal colonial model to an industrialized socialist society.

It should be noted that the internal colonial model is not without certain weaknesses. For example, it tends to downplay benefits derived from political and economic unification of certain territories. One wonders whether Scotland would indeed have been any better off were it an independent and autonomous state. Some have suggested that the model exaggerates the question of dominance.[308] In the case of Ukraine, however, dominance may not be so exaggerated. Moreover, the model does not consider the fact that industrial specialization need not be a negative characteristic. Taking into account Sweden and Switzerland one finds that both have very narrow export bases, yet they are two of the most prosperous European countries.[309] In terms of methodology, Hechter has been accused of relying too heavily on the use of computerized data compiled from electoral returns and other sociological and political statistics. Such data can often

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[308]See Furniss, "Internal colonialism, Its Utility for Understanding the Development of Higher Education in Scotland," p. 463; Anthony Birch shares the same point of view in his article, "Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of National Integration," *World Politics* 30 (April 1978):327.
[309]Ibid., p. 329.

be interpreted in more than one way depending on where statistical limits are set and what variables are used. Finally, Phillip Rawkins argues that a flaw exists in the conceptual framework of the internal colonial model because Hechter claims that "minority nationalism must develop within the context of a persisting cultural division of labour between the English and the non-English indigenous populations of the British Isles."[310] This statement, says Rawkins, is contradicted by another statement made by Hechter, namely that Welsh and Scottish nationalism are:

> ...a manifestation of ethnic solidarity which appears to be a response to the perceptions of patterns of structural discrimination in society at large. Therefore, it is not useful to conceive of it as a traditional or primordial sentiment. On the contrary, such--solidarity represents high political consciousness on the part of groups seeking to alter the cultural division of labour.[311]

This passage, Rawkins continues, indicates that Hechter does not accept the conceptualization that ethnicity is a "primordial sentiment," but rather an experience of modernization that might coincide with a persisting cultural division of labour where an "intensified status group solidarity may develop as an economically disadvantaged subordinate group gains wider access to the necessary resources to facilitate political mobilization."[312] Ethnic solidarity, therefore, can be seen as a "modern response to a modern problem, and not a manifestation of reactive or reactionary politics."[313]

Notwithstanding these criticisms, many of which might only apply to the case of Britain and not necessarily to the nature of inequalities in other developed polities, the internal colonial model has merits. It makes an important contribution to the study of national development because of its broad comparative approach based on a wide range of disciplines which take into account historical, political, cultural and economic factors. In the case of Ukraine the model provides important insights into its plight within the USSR. In particular, the concept of a cultural division of labour is a most useful tool on the analysis of Ukraine's social structure.

We have argued that a number of important characteristics must be evident in Ukraine to classify it as an internal colony; among these are a persistence of inequalities,

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[310]Phillip Rawkins, "Nationalist Movements Within the Advanced Nationalist State: The Significance of culture," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 2 (Fall 1983):228.
[311]Ibid., quote is from Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, P. 340.
[312]Rawkins, "Nationalist Movements," p. 228.
[313]Ibid.

economic dependency, a cultural division of labour, and a reactive nationalism which seeks autonomy and secession.

The process by which Russian institutions and markets encroached on Ukraine was discussed in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. Through expansion, tsarist Russia was able to strengthen and centralize its political authority over Ukraine. Ukraine's manufacturing base was adversely affected by tsarist economic policies and Ukraine's economy was relegated to providing foodstuffs and raw materials for Russia's industries. This relationship resembled overseas colonialism and provided the basis for the internal colonialism which has characterized Ukrainian-Russian relationships. The turning point in Ukraine's subordination to Russian rule was the 1654 Treaty of Periaslav. The loss of sovereignty led to Ukraine's dependency upon Moscow with profound consequences for the country's development. Since Pereiaslav, Russian military and political hegemony has been underscored by the Russian assertion that their culture was superior to the Ukrainian culture. This set in motion a process of Russification of the indigenous Ukrainian population.

With Ukraine's adoption into the Russian Empire, significant socio-economic changes occurred. The most devastating of these was the reinstatement of repressive serfdom. This resulted in a serious distortion in Ukraine's social structure. The free classes of peasants and cossacks dramatically shrunk in size and most Ukrainians became landless bonded serfs. Russians dominated the ruling class since they formed the overwhelming majority of the landowners and merchants.

The economic consequences of incorporation resulted in an uneven and unbalanced economy during Ukraine's industrialization in the second half of the 19th century. Industrialization in Ukraine was highly dependent on Russian interests. This relationship persisted after the Bolshevik takeover of Ukraine as well. Even though natural resources are abundant and readily available, Ukraine's industry has remained highly localized, underdeveloped and its output is almost entirely composed of primary products that are geared for export. This is a reflection of Moscow's policy not to locate industries in Ukraine. The monopolization of the decision making managerial positions by ethnic Russians living in Ukraine has ensured compliance with this policy. Ukraine lacks the necessary autonomous political institutions that would enable it to protect and build its

own economy. Ukraine's economy has developed in a manner which complements rather than competes with Russia. Inspite of economic growth, regional economic inequalities persist. Ukraine endures a lower standard of living, lower per capita income, lower consumption of consumer goods and a lower level of health services than that of Russia. Modernization has not altered this unequal relationship, and has not produced social structural convergence between the core and periphery, as many Soviet and Western modernization theorists predicted would have happened as a consequence of increased core-periphery interaction. On the contrary, as the internal colonial model suggests, social inequalities between Russians and Ukrainians have persisted since incorporation. Russians in Ukraine continue to dominate the leading positions in the social structure. Even though the general well-being of all Soviet citizens may have improved over the past decades, Ukrainians remain at the bottom of the social ladder and the relative differences between Ukraine and the centre have remained unchanged.

Within the context of internal colonialism, it can be argued that the limiting of Ukrainians to a narrow range of subordinate social roles has contributed towards the maintenance of their cultural identity and cultural institutions. "This culture maintenance," Hechter states, "results from the importance of culture in the system of stratification, and the consequent tendencies towards ecological segregation in the work and residential settings."[314] The presence of a cultural division of labour can be readily identified in Ukraine. The result of uneven economic development and persistent inequalities have produced economic and ethnic stratification in Ukraine with the two most important cultural markers identifying Ukrainians being their language and religion.

The peripheral culture is strengthed by demands for greater allocation of resources for the peripheral region.[315] A wide range of Ukraine's population have made these demands -- from workers in the industrialized region of Donbas to nationalist dissidents in Western Ukraine. These demands can also be interpreted as a reaction to regional inequalities based on centuries of Russian supremacy and not merely as a "modern response to a modern problem." In the course of national development spanning three centuries, the cultural differences between Ukrainians and Russians have not disappeared, and certainly a common nationality has not evolved despite heightened interaction between

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[314]Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 344.
[315]Ibid.

the two ethnic groups.

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